Indemnification of Fiduciary and Employee Litigations Costs Under Erisa by Cornell, John R & Little, James J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 1 Number 1 Article 1
12-1-1983
Indemnification of Fiduciary and Employee
Litigations Costs Under Erisa
John R. Cornell
James J. Little
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Retirement Security Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John R. Cornell and James J. Little, Indemnification of Fiduciary and Employee Litigations Costs Under
Erisa, 25 B.C.L. Rev. 1 (1983), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol25/iss1/1
BOSTON COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXV
	
DECEMBER 1983	 NUMBER 1
INDEMNIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY AND
EMPLOYEE LITIGATION COSTS UNDER ERISA -
JOHN R. CORNELL*
JAMES J. LITTLE**
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),' imposes strict
standards of fiduciary responsibility and accountability on persons involved with the
management and disposition of employee benefit funds. The fiduciary responsibility
provisions of ERISA, in essence, codify many principles of traditional trust law and make
them applicable to ER1SA fiduciaries.' Although the origin of these fiduciary responsibil-
ity provisions is clear,' many aspects of a fiduciary's rights and duties under ER1SA
remain unsettled. For example, the exact limits of an ERISA fiduciary's entitlement to
indemnification for legal fees in his capacity as a fiduciary is not at all clear. The legislative
history of ERISA is simply devoid of any explanation or discussion of such indemnifica-
tion rights. Thus, the intended scope of ERISA with respect to such fiduciary indem-
nification is subject to varied interpretation. Also absent front the statutory language
and legislative history of ERISA is any discussion of whether fiduciaries may authorize
indemnification payments by an employee benefit plan to employees who perform ser-
vices for the plan. The absence of any clear congressional guidance in these areas has
created significant practical difficulties for fiduciaries, because if a fiduciary authorizes an
indemnification payment which is not. permitted by ER1SA, the fiduciary will he in breach
of his statutory duties.
The purpose of t his article is to establish workable guidelines for determining when
indemnifying ERISA fiduciaries and employees for their legal costs is proper under the
statute. Section 1 will discuss the provisions of ER1SA relevant to the indemnification of
these two groups. Indemnification principles in the law of trusts, private foundations,
corporations and unions will also he examined to provide guidance in interpreting these
ERISA  provisions. Section II will examine employee indemnification principles in the law
of agency. Finally, based upon an analysis of the indemnification principles analyzed in
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Sections 1 and 11, specific fiduciary and employee indemnification guidelines will he
proposed in Section III for adoption by ERISA benefit. plans. The purpose of these
guidelines is to provide a consistent analytical framework from which to evaluate the
propriety of fund indemnification payments to ER1SA fiduciaries and trustees in place of
the ad hoc decision system which currently is used in tackling indemnification prob-
lems. With a consistent analytic framework, ER1SA fiduciaries will he more adequately
equipped to determine the propriety of any given indemnification request. Consequently,
their exposure to liability for improper authorization of indemnification payments will dra-
matically decrease.
1. FIDUCIARY INDEMNIFICATION PRINCIPLES
A. The Provisions of ERISA Relevant to Fiduciary Indemnification
The basic fiduciary principles of ERISA are set out in section 404(a) 4 which estab-
lishes "uniform federal requirements to be interpreted both in light q . the COMM011 law of trusts, as
well with a view toward the special nature, purpose, and importance of modern employee benefit
plans... 5
The general fiduciary obligations imposed by section 404 are supplemented by t he
specific "prohibited transaction -
 provisions of section 406 of ERISA.' For example,
Section 404(a) provides, in pertinent part;
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and —
(A) for the exclusive purpose of':
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries: and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevail-
ing dm a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minitnite t he risk of large losses,
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as
such documents are consistent with the provisions of this title or Tide IV,
29 U.S.C. § 110400(1) (1976).
5
 Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n., 507 F. Stipp. 378, 383 (D. Hawaii 1980) (emphasis added).
Accord N.L.R.B. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981) ("[w]e must infer that CongresS intended
to impose on [ERISA fiduciaries] traditional fiduciary [trust] duties unless Congress has unequivo-
cally expressed an intent to the contrary."). See also, H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93e1 Cong., 2d Sess. 323,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Coto: Colic. & An. NEWS 4639, 4651 ("The principles of fiduciary conduct are
adopted from existing trust law, but with modifications appropriate For employee benefit plans.").
Section 406 states in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in section 408 For this tide]:
(I) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a
transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or
indirect —
(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between the plan and a party
in interest;
(B) lending of money or other extension of credit het weer the plan and a party
in interest;
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in
interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest, of any assets
of the plan; or
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section 406 was enacted by Congress to prevent categories of transactions which oiler a
high potential for insider abuse of plans or for loss of plan assets.' Section 406(a) prohibits
a fiduciary from causing a plan to enter into transactions with parties whom he knows or
should know are "parties in interest." with respect to the plan.' Such transactions are
prohibited regardless of how incidental the benefit to the party in interest is, and
notwithstanding how beneficial t he transaction may he to the plan and its parlicipants. 9
Section 406(b) also contains broad prohibitions against fiduciary self-dealing and other
forms of misconduct.
Literally interpreted, the provisions of section 406 prohibit an ERISA fiduciary from
obtaining reimbursement or indemnification fir expenses reasonably incurred in the
administration of the fund. Section 408 of ERISA, however, provides certain statutory
exemptions front section 406's broad definition of prohibited transactions. In particular,
section 40.8(c)(2) authorizes the reimbursement of expenses properly incurred by a
fiduciary." A clear example of a "properly incurred" expense is the cost of legal services
incurred to assist. in the regular administration of the fund." The reimbursement au-
thorization granted by section 408(c)(2) for proper expenses actually incurred in the
performance of plan duties, however, does not apply if the expenses are the result of a
(E) acquisition, on behalf of the plan, of any employer security or employer
real property in violation of section 407(a).
(h) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not —
(1) deal with the assets of t he plan in his own interest or for his own account, ...
(3) receive any consideration for his own personal account From any party dealing
with such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan....
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a), (h) (1976).
T ERISA "prescribes new and stringent rules of conduct required for trustees and fiduciaries
administering employee benefit funds, and prohibits conflicts of interest and various specific prac-
tices to prevent actual or potential misuse of such furicts." S. REP. No. 93 - 127, 93d Cong. 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. Sc An. NEWS 4838, 9839. See also, Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank,
485 F. Stipp. 629, 636 - 37 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
A "party in interest" includes any fiduciary, employee of the plan, or person providing services
to the plan, an employer, any of whose employees are covered by the plan, any union, any of whose
members are covered by the plan, any employee, officer, director or ten percent or more shareholder
of an employer or a union, and certain relatives and related entities to certain categories of parties in
interest. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1976).
9 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(2) (1976).
Section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 imposes an initial 5% excise tax upon any
disqualified person (essentially a party in interest) who engages in a "prohibited ransaction" with a
qualified pension plan. I.R.C. § 4975 (1954). Although Section 4975 is not generally discussed
herein, Section 4975(d)(10) uses language similar to that found in ERISA Section 408 to exempt
from its definition of "prohibited transactions" any payment for the "reimbursement of expenses
properly and actually incurred." Id.
" In pertinent part, Section 408(c) states that nothing in Section 406 Shall he construed to
prohibit any fiduciary from:
(2) receiving any reasonable compensation for services rendered, or for the reimburse-
ment of expenses properly and actually incurred, in the performance of his duties with the plan;
except that no person so serving who already receives full-time pay from an employer
or an association of employers, whose employees are participants in the plan, or from
an employee organization whose members are participants in such plan shall receive
compensation from such plan, except for reimbursement of expenses properly and
actually incurred. . . . (emphasis added)
29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(2) (1976).
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breach of a fiduciary's duty under the plan," Specifically, section 409 of ERISA renders a
fiduciary personally liable for any losses to an ERISA plan which result from a breach of
any of his obligations, responsibilities or duties under ERISA."
A corollary to section 409's imposition of personal liability in the event of a fiduciary
breach is section 410's prohibition of indemnification for liabilities incurred as a result of
such a breach." Section 410 expressly provides, however, that insurance may be pur-
chased for the fiduciary either by the plan, if such insurance permits recourse against the
fiduciary in the event of a fiduciary breach, or by the fiduciary himself." Given these
insurance provisions, the Department of Labor' has interpreted section 410 to permit
further any type of indemnification which leaves the fiduciary fully responsible for his
breach, but permits another party to satisfy any liability incurred by the fiduciary in the
same manner as insurance may be purchased under section 410." Agreements which
provide for indemnification of the fiduciary by the plan itself, however, are void." Such
an arrangement would have the same effect as an exculpatory clause in that it would
relieve the fiduciary of responsibility and liability by abrogating the plan's right to recover
from t he fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary obligations."
In certain circumstances, the express language of ERISA specifically establishes
whether an ER1SA fiduciary is allowed indemnification for legal expenses incurred by the
fiduciary in his administration of an ER iSA plan. For example, section 408 allows an
ERISA fiduciary to receive indemnification for reasonable expenses incurred in employ-
ing legal services to assist hint in the regular administration of the fund.'" In all other
' 2 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1976).
Section 409 provides in relevant part:
(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to [he plan resulting from each
such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been
made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary , . .
29	 § 1109(a) (1976).
14 Section 410 provides:
(a) . . . any provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve it
fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under
ihis part shall be void as against public policy.
(b) Nothing in this subpart shall preclude —
(1) a plan from purchasing insurance for its fiduciaries or for itself to cover liability
or losses occurring by reason of the act or omission of a fiduciary, if such insurance
permits recourse by the insurer against the fiduciary in the case of a breach of a
fiduciary obligation by such fiduciary;
(2) a fiduciary from purchasing insurance in cover liability tinder this part front
and for his own account; or
(3) an employer or an employee organization from purchasing insurance to cover
potential liability of one or more persons who serve in a fiduciary capacity with
regard to air employee benefit. plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1110 (1976).
15 As in practical mailer, this provision for insurance coverage is of little help to the fiduciary as
the cost of obtaining such insurance is prohibitive. for example, in 1983 the premium for $2,000,000
coverage was approximately $1,200,000. Accordingly, the availability of such insurance has very little
practical effect on our indemnification discussion.
" See 29	 § 2509.75-4 (1983).
17 Id.
115 Id.
" See supra note 11 and accompanying text. The term "regular administration of the fund"
refers to those duties which are predictable or necessary' to accomplish the fund's purposes.
December 1983]
	
INDEMNIFICATION UNDER ERISA 	 5
circumstances, however, an ERISA fiduciary's right to inclemnification depends upon
whether t he expenses incurred arc deemed "proper" under section 408." Unfortunately,
the legislative history of ERISA is of little help in fixing the scope or the meaning of the
word "proper" except insofar as it refers to t he law of trusts as the basis for many of the
fiduciary responsibility provisions.'
This absence of' a clear standard for identifying "proper - plan expenses makes it very
difficult for fiduciaries to determine under what circumstances they may authorize or
receive indemnification for legal costs consistent with ERISA. For example, although
fiduciaries are clearly not entitled to indemnification if' it is established that they are in
breach of their duties under the plan, it is not at all clear whether it is ever proper under
ERISA for a fiduciary to receive indemnification for expenses incurred in successfully
defending breach of' trust charges. Similarly, it is uncertain whether indemnification is
proper in a situation where a claim against the fiduciary is settled or where the fiduciary is
found only partially guilty of breach of trust charges. Finally, the provisions of ERISA
offer no assistance in determining whether an ERISA fiduciary may ever properly receive
payments of legal expenses incurred in breach of trust litigation prior to a final determi-
nation of the merits of the litigation.
In an effort to provide a general background for understanding ERISA fiduciary
indemnification principles and to formulate appropriate guidelines for answering ques-
tions which are currently unresolved, indemnification principles in the law of trusts,
private foundations, corporations and unions will be examined.
B. Truslee Indemnification Under the Law of Trusts
As a general rule, a trustee is authorized to incur all expenses necessary and proper
to the administration of a private trust." Whether an expense is "necessary" and "proper"
depends to a great extent upon the powers granted to the trustee in the trust instrument
and the context in which the expense is incurred." Technically, the trustee is personally
liable for all expenses properly incurred, but is entitled to indemnity from the (rust
estate." This right to indemnification for expenses properly incurred includes not only
the right of reimbursement after the trustee makes payments out of his individual funds,
but also a right of exoneration, 25 which allows him to use trust property in the first
instance to satisfy an obligation he has incurred as a trustee."
2 ° See .supra note 11 and accompanying text.
2 ' See supra note 2 and accompanying text where it is noted that the legislative history of ER1SA
refers to trust law principles as the basis for the fiduciary responsibility provisions.
22 See generally A. SCOTT, THE LAW or TRUSTS §§ 188, 244 (3d ed. 1967) (hereinafter cited as
SCOTT); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 188 (1959) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT).
22 See SCOTT, supra note 22, at § 188; RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 188.
24 Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 494-95 (1947); Templeton v. Continental Illinois
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 429 F. Supp. 1294, 1304 (N.D. III. 1977); lo re Estate of Fisher, 461 Pa. 696,
700, 337 A.2d 834, 836 (1975). See also Scorr, supra note 22, at § 244.
25 The term "exoneration" is a term of art in trust law. As Professor Scott points out, if a trustee
properly incurs an expense in the administration of the trust, he has a right of reimbursement where
he has made payment out of his personal funds, or he may exonerate his liability for the expense by
applying the trust properly to the discharge of the liability in the first instance, If the trustee
exercised his right of exoneration to satisfy' an expense which was later deemed "improperly
incurred,- the trustee would in most instances he surcharged for the amount taken. See Scan . , supra
note 22, at § 244.
25 SCCM . , SUPTa note 22, at § 244; G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 718 (rev, 2d
ed. 1982) (hereinafter cited as BOGERT).
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Attorneys' fees are one type of expense often incurred in the administration, preser-
vation or execution of the trust estate. The fact that such expenses are typically incurred,
however, does not mean that they are always necessary and proper. It is within the court's
discretion whether these fees will be charged to the trust estate or borne by the trustee
personally. 27
 In exercising such discretion, the courts generally focus on two issues: first,
whether the litigation benefits the interests of the trust estate; 25
 and second, if the
interests are not benefited, whether the outcome of the litigation is favorable to the
trustee, 2 "
I. Benefits of Litigation
Courts allow expenses for attorneys' fees and other related costs to be paid from the
trust estate if' the litigation is brought for the benefit of the trust as a whole." Conversely,
costs and fees will not be allowed out of the trust estate under this principle if the suit is
brought for the benefit of the complaining beneficiary or if the defense is interposed for
the benefit of the defendant trustee.' -
The Supreme Court of Kansas decision in Jennings v. Alurdock 32 is illustrative. In
Jennings, the beneficiaries of a spendthrift trust sought to compel the trustee to vote stock
held in trust as they directed . 33
 Additionally, plaintiffs requested that their attorneys' fees
be paid from the trust estate.' The court rejected plaintiffs' first claim holding that the
trust instrument vested voting discretion entirely with the trustee. 35
 Considering the
plaintiffs' second request, the court determined that since plaintiffs' action conferred a
benefit on the trust estate by helping to establish the respective roles of the trustees and
beneficiaries, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs should be paid by the estate."" According
in Cann v. Barry, 298 Mass. 186, 189, 10 N.F.,2d 88, 89-90 (1937), the court refused to advance
the trustee security from the trust for expenditures he might have to make. In McClure v.
Middletown Trust Co., 95 Conn. 148, 160, 110 A. 838, 842 (1920), the trustee was not required to
advance his own funds to meet obligations of the estate where the estate had no assets. These cases
taken together suggest that while the trustee need not incur liability on behalf of the estate whets
there are no assets to reimburse him, the right to reimbursement or exoneration does not arise until
the expense is certain and definite, as opposed to hypothetical or conjectural.
27 See In re Storm's Estate, 40 Misc, 2d 390, 391.92; 243 N.V.8.2d 53, 55 (1963); Murphy v.
Dalton, 314 S.W.2d 726, 733 (Mo. 1958): West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 100 So. 2d
807, 812 (Fla. 1958). See also BOGERT, Stipra note 26, at § 871.
za See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
3"
 Weidlich v. Cornley, 267 F.2d 133, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1959) (trustee's defense of suit held
beneficial to estate); in re Estate of Campbell, 46 Hawaii 475, 522, 382 P.2d 920, 953 (1963)
(groundless suit attacking validity of trustee appointment held not beneficial to estate); In re
Freeman, 247 Minn. 50, 56, 75 N.W.2c1 906, 910 (1956) (unsuccessful suit charging trustee with
improper trust tnanagement held beneficial to the estate); Linn v. Lints, 146 Neb. 666, 669, 21
N.W.2d 283, 284 (1946) (suit to enforce trust and compel at] accounting held beneficial to the estate).
See also 76 Ast. JUR. 2d Trusts § 657 (1975); REsTATEmENT, supra note 22, at § 245.
31 RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 245.
' 2
 220 Km. 182, 553 P.2d 846 (1976).
" Id. at 184-85, 553 P.2d at 851.
" Id. at 185, 553 P.2d at 851.
" Id. at 211, 553 P.2d at 869.
3' Id. at 215, 553 P.2d at 872. See also Zimmerman v. First Nat'l Bank, 348 So. 2d 1359, 1367
(Ala. 1977) (under statute award of parties' attorneys' lees not proper when litigation not beneficial
to estate); Palmer v. Hanford Nat'l Bank & nisi Co., 16(1 Conn. 415, 420, 279 A.211 726, 733-34
(1971) (beneficiary who with his OWIS funds has benefited estate has right to recover expenses from
trust estate). See generally BOGERT, Stitirti note 26, at § 871.
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to thejennings court, the fact that plaintiffs sought to reap personal benefit from their suit
did not preclude a benefit from being conferred on the estate.'' Jennings is significant, in
that it not only recognizes the validity of the estate benefit theory, but also recognizes that
estate benefit is not limited to financial or monetary gain.
2. Outcome of the Litigation
In an action charging the trustee with breach of t rust, litigation costs may be imposed
on the trust estate even though the litigation does not benefit the trust if the trustee
successfully defends the charges:is Attorneys' fees are also recoverable when there is no
decision on the merits, as is the case when the suit is'dismissed by the plaintiff.'" On t he
other hand, if' the trustee is found to have breached his duties, he must personally bear his
litigation expenses."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania illustrated these principles in In Re Coulter'
where the beneficiaries of an express trust brought an action against the trustee,  charging
him with negligent administration and self-dealing:" The beneficiaries requested that the
trustee he surcharged for all losses proximately caused by his conduct." The court denied
the beneficiaries' claim, finding no evidence of negligence or self-dealing by the t rust cc.'"
in addition, the court held t hat. the trustee's attorneys' fees were chargeable to the trust
estate. The court stated, "NI is well established that whenever there is an unsuccessful
attempt by a beneficiary to surcharge a fiduciary the latter is entitled to an allowance out
of the estate to pay for counsel fees and necessary expenditures in defending himself
against the attack. -45
3. Effect of Trustee's Good or Bad Faith on Indemnification Right
Under certain circumstances, the trustee is entitled to indemnification for expenses
incurred, even if the expenses were not proper, and regardless of the outcome of
litigation instituted against him. For example, if the trustee takes action in good faith
37 22{) Kan. at 215, 553 P.2d at 872.
Significantly, in Ball v. Mills, 376 So. 2d 1174, 1179 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied sub nom., Mills v. Ball,
388 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1980), the court noted that a trustee might be granted an interim award of
attorneys' fees, prior to a merits determination of the litigation, if the trustee could demonstrate that
such fees were beneficial and necessary to the trust estate. The court observed that it was necessary to
determine that the services were both beneficial to the trust and reasonable and necessary, prior to an
interim award of funds paying for such services.
3" See In re Smat hers, 212 NX.5.2d 152, 155 (1961); Coates v. Coates, 316 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Mo.
App. 1958); In re Coulter, 379 Pa. 209, 108 A.2d 681, 686 (1954).
3" Saulsbury v. Demon Nat'l Bank, 25 Md. App. 669, 677, 335 A.2d 199, 203 (1975).
4" Harvey v. Leonard, 268 N.W.2d 504, 517 (Iowa 1978); Behrman v. Egan, 31 N.J. Super. 95,
100, 106 A.2d 36, 39 (1953). See generally Boc,F.RT, supra note 26, at § 871.
4i 379 Pa. 209, 108 A.2d 681 (1954).
" Id. at 214, 108 A.2d at 683-84.
" Id. at 217, 108 A.2d at 685.
44 Id. at 220, 108 A.2d at 686.
45 Id. at 220, 108 A.2d at 686 (quoting in re Wormley, 359 Pa. 295, 300, 59 A.2d 98, 100 (1948)).
See also Leibrandt v. Adler, 30 111. App. 2d 257, 262, 174 N.E.2d 228, 230 (1961) (unsuccessful
trustees in will construction case not entitled to attorneys' lees if suit brought for personal benefit);
Hatfield v. First Nat'l Bank, 317.111. App. 169, 182, 46 N,E.2d 94, 100 (1943) (trustee not being liable
for surcharge entitled to recover solicitor's fees). Sre generally Annot., 9 A.L,12.2d 1132 (1950)
(allowance of attorneys' fee in, or other cost of, litigation by beneficiary respecting trust).
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which results in a benefit to the estate indemnification is proper." A trustee is not entitled
to indemnification for expenses not properly incurred, however, if he takes action in had
faith, even t hough it benefits t he estate:" This principle is demonstrated in Craven v.
Craven" where the defendant trustee held certain properties in trust for the benefit of
plaintiff.'" The terms of the trust authorized defendant to make expenditures which were
"reasonably necessary" to maintain the trust properties. 5 " The defendant authorized a
substantial number of expenditures for capital improvements, maintenance and re-
pairs. 5 ' The plaintiff charged that these expenditures were excessive and thereby consti-
tuted a breach of trust." Plaintiff' prayed for an accounting and the defendant coun-
terclaimed seeking indemnity for all expenses incurred. 53
The Supreme Court of Illinois agreed with plaintiff and held that defendant's
expenditures for capital improvements constituted a breach of trust because the terms of
the trust did not contemplate outlays for such excessive capital improvements." The
court noted, however, that its holding did not automatically require denial of defendant's
request for indemnity." The court observed that "[w]here a trustee or agent makes
unauthorized improvements he may or may not he reimbursed to the extent t he property
is benefited, depending upon whether he acted in good faith or in bad faith.'' Consider-
ing the expenses for which the trustee sought indemnity, the court found that a substan-
tial portion of defendant's reimbursement claim consisted of charges for defendant's own
labor.'" Such charges constituted self-dealing by defendant because he was performing
unauthorized services with his own labor and, as such, this indicated bad faith." Conse-
quently, the court denied defendant's claim for indemnity."
" In re Rainone, 33 A.D.2d 1048, 1048, 309 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530 (1970) (former trustee indem-
nified for improperly incurred expenses which benefit estate); In re Griffith, 33 Del. Ch. 387, 399,
93 A.2d 920, 92411953) (trustee indemnified for unauthorized expenditures which benefit the
estate). See also RESTAT EMF,NT, supra note 22, at 245. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for a
discussion of other cases upholding right to indemnification for expenses which benefit the estate.
While no cases have been found which deal specifically with indemnification fbr attorneys' fees
improperly incurred, but which benefit t he estate, the principles discussed herein appear nonetheless
applicable to such a situation. See Scorr, supra note 22, at § 246.
' 7
 Craven v. Craven, 407 Ill. 252, 262, 95 N.E.2d 489, 495 (1950); Trimble v. Boles, 169 Okla.
228, 230, 36 1'.2d 861, 864 (1934) (trustee who denied existence of resulting trust and claimed trust
property as his own in had faith, not entitled to expenses). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at
§ 245 comment g; SCOTT, supra note 22, at § 245.1.
4"
 407 Ill. 252, 95 N.E.2d 489 (1950).
-1 " Id. at 253, 95 N.E.2d at 491.
Id. at 262, 95 N.E.2d at 495.
"	 at 257, 95 N.E.2d at 493. The capital improvements consisted of the following: new
chimney, new hack porches, new fence and gates, new doors on garage, new storerooms and coal bins
in basement, insulation of roof, new sinks its two apartments, re m odeling, of front entrance and first
floor apartment, rewiring of the entire building, new light fixtures in all apartments, front hall and
basement, new locks on all doors front and rear, including t he basement and garage, and new screens
for the entire building. Id.
" /d. at 262, 95 N.E.24.1 at 495.
" /0. at 253, 95 N.E.2d at 491.
" 10. at 262-63, 95 N.E.2d at 495-96.
" 10. at 262, 95 N.E.2d at 495.
56 Id,
57 Id. at 263, 95 N.E.2d at 496.
" ld,
" It!.
The principles of crust law indemnification discussed in Section I,B apply to both contractual
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4. Effect of Exculpatory Provisions on Indemnification Right
If specifically authorized by an exculpatory clause in the trust instrument, a trustee
may bind the estate and avoid personal liability for most liabilities incurred irrespective of
any right to indemnification." For example, in Crain v. Fountain"' the trustee was given
absolute discretion in 1 he management of the trust estate. According to the trust, he was
to be relieved from all personal liability for expenses incurred in the administration of the
estate, except those costs incurred on account of bad faith." In the course.of administer-
ing the trust, the trustee hired an attorney to assist hint withh trust aflairs. 63 Alter the
trustee died, the attorney instituted a claim against the trust estate for services rendered. 64
The beneficiaries objected to the suit on the ground than the attorneys' fees were a
personal liability of the trustee and could not be properly construed as a direct charge
against the estate." The Supreme Court of Mississippi, however, rejected the ben-
eficiaries' claim and held t hat a trust instrument could, by its express terms, insulate a
trustee front liability for expenses otherwise borne by the trustee, provided the intent of
the senior was clear."
A trust instrument expressly providing that t he trustee shall not be liable "except for
willful default or gross negligence" is an example of an exculpatory provision designed to
relieve the trustee of tortious or contractual liabilities incurred in the administration of
the trust estate for which he :night otherwise be liable," Such provisions are strictly
construed by the courts, however, and are often stuck down on public .policy grounds."
and tortious liability incurred by the trustee in the administration of the trust. See Scurr,supra note
22, at §§ 246-247. Therefore, while a trustee is personally liable upon a contract made in the
administration of the trust, he is entitled to indemnification for any claims arising under such
contract if such contractual liability is properly incurred, Hamlen v. Welch, 116 F.2d 413, 418 (1st
Cir. 1940); geyser v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 625, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Pan American
Petroleum Corp. v. Gibbons, 168 F. Supp. 867, 876-77 (D. Utah 1958), qf'd, 262 F.2c1 852, 855-56
(10th Cir. 1958); Lazenby v. Colman, 28 F. Supp. 949, 950-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). If the trustee
improperly incurs contractual liability, he is nonetheless entitled to indemnification if he acts in good
faith and the trust estate is benefited. SecErr, supra note 22, at § 246.
Similarly, a trustee who incurs tortious liability in the proper administration of the trust is
entitled to indemnification provided he is not personally at fault. See generally Sherr v. Winkler, 552
F.2d 1367, 1377 (10th Cir. 1977) (non-negligent trustee not personally liable to beneficiaries for
losses to estase); Cook v. Holland, 575 S.W.2d 468, 476 (Ky. 1978) (non-negligent trustee indem-
nified for injury caused by trustee's agent); Smith v. Rizzuto, 133 Neb. 655, 660, 276 N.W. 406, 409
(1937) (trustee personally liable for damages if personally responsible for dangerous condition of
property).
" See Scurr, , supra note 22, at §§ 270 - 71; 76 AM. ,juts. 2D Trwsts § 353 (1975); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 22, at § 270.
" 159 Miss. 619, 126 So. 18 (1930), modified, 159 Miss. 653, 132 So, 559 (1931).
" Id. at 643, 126 So. at 21.
" Id. at 637, 126 So. at 19.
64 Id .
" Id. at 639, 126 So. at 20.
66
 Id. at 644, 126 So. at 22.
" First Nat'l Bank v. Edgeworth, 94 III. App. 3d 873, 882, 419 N.E.2d 372, 379 (1981); Sullivan
v. Mosner, 266 Md. 479, 495 -96, 295 A.2d 482, 491-96 (1972); Jarvis v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank, 478
S.W.2d 266, 274 (Mo. 1972). See also Scow, supra note 22, at § 222; RESTA'rEMENT supra note 22, at
§ 222.
" See Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718; 736-37 (D. Colo. 1967);
Hoppe v. Hoppe, 370 So. 2d 374, 375 (Ha. 1978), rert. denied, 379 So. 2d 206 (Ha. 1979); Langford v.
Shamburger, 417 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See also Scol-r, supra note 22, at .§§ 222.2,
222.3; BOGERT, supra 110O.! 26, at § 542.
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An example of this public policy doctrine is found in Vredenburgh v. Jones," where the
trustee was given "complete and unquestioned" discretion with regard to the manage-
ment of certain mining properties." The trust instrument exculpated the trustee from
liability and provided for indemnification of all his expenses!' In the course of adminis-
tering the trust, the trustee breached his fiduciary duties by self-dealing with the trust
properties." The beneficiaries sued to recover the assets which the trustee had sold to
himself." The Chancery Court of Delaware confronted the question of whether the
trustee was entitled to indemnity pursuant to the terms of the trust instrument for all
liabilities assessed against him. 74
 Despite the broad exculpatory language of the trust
instrument, the court held the trust's indemnity provisions inapplicable, and rendered
the trustee personally liable for all losses to the trust resulting from his self-dealing."
Although it did not expressly articulate its reasoning, the court felt that it would be
contrary to public policy to relieve the trustee of the liabilities normally attendant upon
acts of self-dealing.
5. Summary of Private Trust Law Indemnification Principles
in summary, there are essentially four rules of indemnification relating to legal
expenses incurred in the administration of a private trust. First, indemnification of legal
expenses is proper where the litigation maintained by the applicant benefits the trust
estate!" Second, in a breach oftrust action, indemnification of a trustee's legal expenses is
proper where the trustee is successful in his defense." Third, in an unsuccessful breach
of trust action, indemnification is generally not proper unless the trustee acted in good
faith and the trust estate was benefited. Even if these conditions are met, indemnification
is proper only to the extent that the estate benefits." Fourth, exculpatory provisions may
broaden the scope of indemnification unless such provisions are deemed void on public
policy grounds."
C. Indemnification of the Foundation Manager Under the Law of
Private Foundations
Fiduciary indemnification principles are also found in the tax area. The Internal
Revenue Code ("Code") provides minimum standards of conduct for the trustees and
managers of private foundations. The Code also provides guidelines governing idem-
nification payments to a manager of a private foundation for expenses incurred in the
administration of the foundation.
" 349 A,2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1975).
7 " Id. at 27.	 '
7 ' Id. at 28.
72 Id. at 30 -32.
" Id. at 32.
74 Id. at 37.
75 Id. at 37-38.
T" See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
The rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a trustee of a charitable trust are similar to those of a
private trustee. Accordingly, the indemnification and exculpation provisions applicable to a private
trustee are in most instances equally applicable to a charitable trustee except to the extent such rules
may be tnodified by the doctrine of charitable tort immunity.
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Every charitable organization exempt from income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the
Code is presumed to be a private foundation, subject to certain exceptions such as publicly
supported charities." The Code prohibits certain types of self-dealing transactions be-
tween private charitable foundations and their managers."' The Code defines "self-
dealing" transactions as "any direct or indirect transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a
disqualified person of the income or assets of a private foundaiion."" 2 Significantly, a
foundation manager is included in the definition of a "disqualified person.' If a
self-dealing transaction occurs, an excise tax is imposed upon the foundation manager
and the self dealer participating in the transaction."
While this prohibition against manager self-dealing would appear to preclude in-
demnification or reimbursement of the fund manager for expenses incurred in the admin-
istration of the foundation, section 494! of the Code specifically permits payment of
reasonable compensation and reimbursement of expenses to such persons." In fact, the
Treasury Regulations under this section expressly provide that a foundation manager
may receive indemnification for expenses reasonably incurred in the administration of
the foundation."" The law of private foundations also permits the fund manager to
receive advance payments of foundation funds to meet anticipated expenses."'
A number of Revenue Rulings interpreting section 494I(d)(1)(D) of the Code and
the regulations promulgated thereunder allow a foundation manager to be indemnified
" E.R.G. § 50I(c)(3) (1954), as amended. The term "private foundation" is defined in I.R.C.
§ 509(a) (1954).
"I 1.R.C. § 4941. Specific acts prohibited include: (1) the sale, exchange or leasing of property;
(2) lending of money or other extension of credit; (3) furnishing of goods, services or facilities;
(4) payment of compensation or expenses to a "disqualified person" which includes the fund man-
ager; and (5) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified person of the foundation's income
or assets. Id.
" Id. at § 4941(d)(1)(E).
"3 Id. ht § 4946(a)(1)(B).
" Id. at § 4941.
Ks Id. at § 4941(d)(2)(E) provides in part:
[T]he payment of compensation (and the payment or reimbursement of expenses) by a
private foundation to a disqualified person for personal services which are reasonable
and necessary to carrying out the exempt purpose of the private foundation shall not be
an act of self-dealing if the compensation (or payment or reimbursement) is not
excessive . . . .
Id.
" Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-3(c) (1973) specifically provides that:
the payment of cotnpensation (and the payment or reimbursement of expenses, includ-
ing reasonable advances for expenses anticipated in the immediate future) by a private
foundation to [the foundation manager] for the performance of personal services
which are reasonable and necessary to carry out the exempt purpose of the private
foundation shall not be an act of self-dealing if' such compensation (or payment as
reimbursement) is not excessive. . . Further, the making of a cash advance to a
Foundation manager or employee for expenses on behalf of the foundation is not an act
of self-dealing so long as the amount of the advance is reasonable in relation to the
duties and expense requirements of the foundation manager, Similar provision is
found in the taw of trusts.
Id. See supra. note 22 and accompanying text.
" Section 4941, however, does not explicitly create a substantive right to receive advances
beyond that granted by traditional trust law principles. As previously noted, the law of trusts requires
the expense to be reasonably definite and certain before receipt of trust funds is proper. See supra
note 26.
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for expenses incurred in the administration of the foundation which confer a benefit on
the foundation. For example, in Revenue Ruling 73-613" the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") held that a private foundation's payment of its manager's legal fees did not
constitute self-dealing and was therefore allowable." The manager had filed suit against
the other directors to require them to carry out the foundation's charitable purpose."
According to the IRS, the litigation helped accomplish I he foundation's charitable pur-
poses and, thus, was beneficial to the foundation."' Given this beneficial effect, the
manager's litigation expenses were permitted to be paid from the foundation's assets."
A similar result was reached in Revenue Ruling 74-405, 93 where the IRS held that
payments by a foundation to indemnify a "disqualified person" against liability for claims
in connection with his assistance in the preparation of a stock registration statement did
not constitute self-dealing." The disqualified person a greed  to assist in the preparation of
a registration statement which was to be filed with the Securities anti Exchange Commis-
sion only if the foundation indemnified him against all liability for claims arising from the
registration process." The stock sold pursuant to this registration process enabled the
foundation to sell a substantial block of stock that would otherwise have given rise to
liability for taxes on excessive business holdings. 9" The IRS noted that because the
services of the disqualified person were necessary to preserve t he tax exempt status of' he
foundation, the indemnification. payments were allowable as an appropriate expense
which benefited the charitable estate. 97
These rulings demonstrate the IRS's willingness to follow indemnification principles
front the private law of trusts in exempting from tax self-dealing payments made by a
private foundation which operate as a benefit. to the foundation estate. The IRS also
follows the law of trusts in that it exempts otherwise self dealing payments made to a
foundation manager who successfully defends breach of trust litigation.
While the Code clearly provides that the payment by a private foundation of any
excise tax imposed upon a foundation manager under Code sections 4941-4945 consti-
tutes self-dealing," the IRS has adopted the position that where a foundation manager
successfully defends against the imposition of an excise tax, or where the proceedings are
settled, and the manager has not acted willfully or without reasonable cause, the founda-
tion may pay his reasonable attorney's fees. 99
" 1973-2 C.B. 385, 385.
89 Id.
9 " Id.
9 ' Id.
92 a
9 ' 1979.2 C.B. 384.
9 ' Id. at 384 -85.
as Id. at 384.
911
97 Id. at 384-85. See also Rev. Rut. 495, 1975-2 C.B. 449 involving Section 4942 computations,
where a beneficiary's legal fees, incurred in a suit to construe the terms of the foundation instrument,
were held to be reasonably necessary to the administration of the foundation and, therefore,
properly payable by the foundation, and deductible for purposes of computing any Section 4942 tax.
99 See §§ 9991(a)(I) and (2), 9991(d)(1)(E). See also H.R. REP, No. 91-782, 91st Cong,, 1st Sess.
279 (1969).
" Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(3) (1973). The indemnification policy espoused by these regula-
tions and the relevant private and charitable trust law is to he contrasted with the more liberal state
corporation laws which allow indemnification of reasonable legal expenses in a third party suit
regardless of whether the defense of the litigation is successful. See ity'rn note 198 and accompanying
text.
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This principle has been applied by the IRS in a number of revenue rulings. In
Revenue Ruling 82-223,"" the IRS held that indemnification payments made by a private
foundation 10 its manager fbr legal fees and costs incurred in settling a suit brought by
state officials fbr alleged mismanagement did not constitute self-dealing.'" Because the
manager's acts satisfied the nonwillful and reasonable cause tests, the IRS fbund that such
payments were proper "expenses" within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-
2(f)(3). 112 The IRS noted, however, that any settlement amount paid by the foundation
on behalf of the manager would be taxable to the manager as an act of self-dealing.'"
The Service characterized the settlement amount as a personal liability of the foundation
manager, rather than as a properly payable expense of the foundation."' The logic of
this rule stems, of course, front the fact that any indemnification by the foundation of a
settlement amount paid to the foundation would merely result in the funds first being
paid by the manager to the foundation, and then being paid back to the manager..
Significantly, the IRS also held that a foundation could properly pay premiums for
an insurance policy protecting the manager against all liabilities, including settlement
amounts, provided, however, that such premiums were treated as compensation paid to
the manager, and that his total compensation was not excessive within the meaning of
section 4941(d)(2)(E) of the Code. Such an expense, the Service reasoned, was necessary
and appropriate in order for the foundation to "attract and retain qualified nianagement
personnel.""° In effect, this holding permits private foundations to insure their man-
agers against liabilities incurred in the administration of the fund regardless of whether
the foundation has the power to indemnify the manager in the first instance, so long as
the cost of this insurance and other compensation to the managers meets a reasonable
compensation test. ""`
To summarize, there are three rules of indemnification applicable to legal expenses
incurred in the administration of a private foundation. First, indemnification of legal
expenses is proper where the litigation benefits the private foundation.' Second,
indemnification of legal fees and costs incurred in settling a suit brought against a
foundation manager on behalf of the. foundation is properprovided the alleged wrongful
acts of the manager are reasonable and non-willful.'" Third, indemnification or reim-
bursement to pay premiums for an insurance policy which protects the manager against
'"" 19H2-2 G.B. 301.
'"' Id. at 303.
02
103 id.
Id. in 302.
"5 Id.
1 "" Corporate law statutes also permit the corporation to purchase insurance on behalf of a
director, officer, agent or employee against liabilities incurred in their respective capacities regard-
less of whether the corporation would have the power to indemnify them in the first instance. See
nyiyi text accompanying note 156.
Left unanswered by Revenue Ruling 82 -223, which involves an action brought by state officials,
and Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(0)-2(0(3) which refers to "a judicial or administrative proceeding involv-
ing ... state laws relating to mismanagement of funds of charitable organizations .. ," is the extent
to which indemnification is proper when private suits charging mismanagement are brought. This
question is not of great significance, however, because virtually all actions involving private founda-
tions will involve state officials because state laws give the officials supervisory responsibilities over
charitable trusts.
1 " See .supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
"'" See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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all liabilities, including settlement amounts, is proper provided such premium payments
are treated as compensation to the manager and the total compensation package is
reasonable.'""
D. Director Indemnification Under Corporate Law
I. The Common Law Right of Corporate Indemnification
Under the common law corporate directors did not have a clear right to indemnifica-
tion for legal expenses incurred in defending charges of wrongdoing. In most instances,
courts routinely denied indemnification to a director found guilty of wrongdoing because
it was believed that a corporation could not justifiably pay the expenses of a director
found derelict in his duties.'" There are some cases, however, which suggest that a
director's good faith might entitle him to indemnification regardless of t he outcome of
litigation against hint.'"
One of the first cases to deal with the issue of director indemnification was Figge v.
Bergenthal .'" In that case, the director defendants successfully defended charges of fraud
and paid their legal expenses with corporate funds.'" The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
rejected the plaintiff shareholders' objection that any director indemnification would be
improper, stating without further discussion or citation of authority, that "[c]fearly, if no
case is made against defendants it is not improper or unjust that the corporation should
pay for the defense of the action."" 4 While the Figge court recognized that a corporation
had the power to indemnify a successful director, the case did not establish a common law
right to indemnification for successful corporate directors.
Not all cases subsequent to Figge agreed with its holding t hat corporations had t he
power to authorize indemnification of the legal expenses of' a successful director. For
example, in Griesse v. Lang," 5 the directors successfully defended charges of wrongdoing,
and subsequently paid their litigation expenses with corporate funds." (' The Ohio Court
of' Appeals upheld an action to compel the defendants to return the money, holding that
the corporation did not have the power to award the payment,'" The Griesse court
I" 9 See supra 1101c 106 and accompanying text.
"" See,e.g., Kansas Operating Corp. v. Durwood, 278 F.2d 354, 358 (8th Cir. 1960); McCourt v.
Singer's-Bigger, 145 F. 103, 114 (8th Cir. 1906); Chabot & Richard Co. v. Chabot, 109 Me. 403,
405-07, 84 A, 892, 893-94 (1912); General Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Guarantee Mortgage & Sec.
Corp., 264 Mass. 253, 260-61, 162 N.E. 319, 322 (1928); McConnell v. Combination Mining &
Milling Co., 31 Mont. 563, 566, 79 P. 248, 249 (1905).
1 " See, e.g., Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 590, 64 A.2(1 581,
607-08 (1948) (corporation has interest in clearing directors or insider stock manipulation charge
because of potential adverse effect of unfavorable finding on defense-contract negotiations): Simon
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 205, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270, 274 (Sup. Ct. 1942), alf'd without
opinion, 267 A.D. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944) (corporation stud directors are joined as defendants in
an antitrust suit, t he corporation has an interest in also defending its directors); Albrecht, Maguire &
Co. v. General Plastics, Inc., 256 A.D. 134, 139, 9 N.Y.S.2d 415, 420, of 'd, 280 N.Y. 840, 21 N.E.2d
887 (1939) (director sued by shareholder in derivative action to require declaration that amendment
to charter is void, corporation has interest in defending director who acted in good f;iii h).
'I' 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581 (1907).
13 Id, at 612, 109 N.W. at 587.
111 Id. at 625, 109 N.W. at 592.
I" 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931).
oli
17 Id. at 558-59. 175 N.E. at 223-24.
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observed that, absent shareholder approval, funds of a corporation could be expended
only for the benefit of the corporation.'" The court found t hat because the shareholders
did not approve t he payment, and the litigation did not benefit the corporation, the
payment of the directors' expenses could not be sum ained.' '" The court's reliance on the
benefit theory in disallowing the indemnification payment was not supported by cited
authority or logic. Perhaps the absence of such authority explains why many subsequent
cases have not required a meaningful showing of corporate benefit in permitting in-
demnification of successful directors.'"
The common law confusion concerning a successful corporate director's right to
indemnification of legal expenses culminated in the landmark case of New York Dock Co. v.
McCollum. 12 I In McCollum, the Supreme Court of Onondaga County refused to permit
indemnification of directors who had successfully defended charges of wrongdoing. 122 As
in Griesse, the court noted t hat the litigation conferred no benefit on the corporation 2:1
and held that the corporation did not have the power to indemnify the expenses of such
litigation."' The McCollum court based its holding upon its determination that it clirect or
should not be given the indemnification traditionally given to an agent 125 who would
typically he indemnified under such circumstances — because the position of corporate
director was created by statute. 12 "
The common law's uncertain treatment of a corporate director's right to indemnifica-
tion in shareholder derivative suits is also present in cases involving indemnification rights
of directors in third party, nonshareholder suits. In third party suits, the corporation-
director relationship has been analogized to the principal-agent relationship, and regular
agency indemnification principles have been theoretically applied."' Despite this com-
parison, however, in practice, courts nonetheless obeli denied indemnification. For ex-
ample, in DuPuy v. Crucible Steel Co., 129 a director acquitted of fraud charges in filing t he
corporation's tax return was held not entitled to indemnification of his legal fees because
Id. at 557, 175 N.E. at 223.
" 9 Id. at 553-56, 175 N.E. at 223-24. Accord, Bailey v. Rush Terminal Co., 46 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880
(Sup. Ct. 1943), gIrd, 267 A.D. 899, 48 N.Y.S.2d 324, VW mem., 293 N.Y. 735, 56 N.E.2d 739.5`2
N.Y.S.2d 734 (1944).
"0 In to E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 215, 45 N.W.2d 388, 393 (1950); Solimine v.
Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 273, 19 A.2(1 344, 348 (Ch. 1941). Significantly, in both these cases the
courts held that corporations could not pay litigation expenses of directors accused of' fiduciary
breaches until a favorable termination of the suit.
"' 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
122 Id. at 111-12, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 849-50.
123 Id. at 111, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
124 Id .
125 Id. at 109, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
126 Id. at 109-10, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 847-48.
Common law cases like Griesse and McCollum, which require the litigation to benefit the corpora-
tion before indemnification is proper, have been severely criticized. Most authors agree that corpo-
rate funds are to be expended only for the benefit of the corporation. They argue, however, that to
look for the "benefit" in the litigation itself is improper because rarely, if ever, is a successful director
defense of direct benefit to the corporation. Rather, the commentators contend that the "benefit"
results from the act of indemnification itself insofar as indemnification enables the corporation to
attract and retain qualified personnel. See generally J. lirstioi. JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS § 5.03 (1981); Bishop, Current Status of Corporate Directors' Right to Indemnification, 69
H ARV. L. REV. 1057 (1956).
127 See, e.g., Du Puy v. Crucible Steel Co., 288 F. 583, 585 (W.D. Pa. 1923).
125 Id.
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it was not within the scope of his agency to act in such a way that he might subject himself'
to criminal liability. Similar reasoning was expressed in Hock v. Duluth Brewing & Malting
Co.,' 9 wherein a director who had held title to a piece of land for the benefit of the
corporation was sued by a subsequent purchaser for a defect in the title."' ) Even though
successful in defending the charges against him, the director was denied indemnity
because, according m the court, a director is not entitled to indemnification for liabilities
which arise from his own misconduct, are not a result of' he execution of the agency, or -
are caused by the independent and unexpected wrongful acts of others."'
Not all courts considering an innocent director's right to indemnification in a third
party suit, however, have followed the holdings in DuPuy and Hock. Other third party
cases have reached a completely opposite result, and allowed indemnification of a guilty
director who acted in good faith where the corporation was benefited by the defense of
the suit."' For example, in Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General Plustics,' 33 the Supreme
Court of New York held in a stockholder's action against a corporation and the officers
thereof for a declaration that an amendment of the certificate of incorporation was void,
that the individual defendants who acted in good faith were entitled to indemnification
for their litigation costs even though plaintiff successfully prosecuted its suit.'" The court
noted that t he individual defendants, by acting in good faith, were in essence carrying out.
the mandate of t he stockholders and, therefore, ought not be required to bear the burden
of litigation costs arising from their official duties." 5
As the above discussion indicates, the third-party cases are as inconsistent as the
shareholder derivative cases. The uncertainty and unrest in the business community
caused by these inconsistent and often unfavorable opinions provided the impetus for a
great flood of legislation designed to unify and detail the scope of corporate indemnifica-
tion principles.' •
2. The Statutory Right of Corporate Indemnification
Modern statutes moved towards liberalizing director indemnification rights and
shielding directors from personal liability. The indemnification provisions of the Dela-
ware slat ute,' 37 which are substantially identical to those adopted in the Model Business
Corporation Act, 13 H serve as the model for the large majority of other states.'" The New
York statute is typical of the slightly stricter view found in a very small number of
129 173 Minn. 374, 217 N.W. 503 (1928).
Id. at 375, 217 N.W. at 503.
" I Id. at 376-77, 217 N.W. at 504.
122
 See supra note i 1 1 and accompanying text.
133 256 A.D. 134, 9 N.Y.S.2d 415, aff'd, 280 N.Y. 840, 21 N.E.2d 887 (1939).
134 id. at 139, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
135 Id.
I " See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-001 to 10-149 (1977 & Supp. 1983-1984); CAL. CORP,
CODE §§ 100 10 2319 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984); Coi.o. REV. S'rAT. §§ 7-1-101 to 7-10-113 (1973 &
Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.001 io 607.414 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-1-1-1 to 23-1-12-4 (Burns 1984).
' 37
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1975).
' 3 " MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 5 (1971).
129 Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus.
LAW. 1993, 1996 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Johnston).
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states."" Consequently, t he Delaware statute will he discussed is representative of the
"general" corporate law of the United States. Distinctions in the New York statute will be
highlighted where relevant,
The indemnification provisions of Delaware law are contained in section 145 of the
Delaware Cock."' Section 145 distinguishes between third party actions and shareholder
derivative suits, granting a broader right to indemnification in the case of third party
actions."2 Although the specific rationale for this distinction is not expressly articulated, it
is presumably based on the concept that in a third party suit the director is like an agent
acting in good faith to accomplish corporate goals, so that traditional agency indemnifica-
tion principles should apply. In a shareholder derivative suit, however, the director is
presumably viewed as having worked against corporate interests. indemnification under
such circumstances would defeat the purpose of the shareholder suit, which is to recover
from the director the value of that which he has taken from the corporation.'"
In a shareholder derivative action, Delaware law permits a director to he indemnified
for expenses, including attorneys' fees, if he acted in good faith and in a manner
reasonably believed to be "in or not opposed to" the best interests of the corporation.'
An exception to this rule exists where he is adjudged guilty of misconduct or negli-
gence."' Because this right applies only to "expenses," it does not permit. indemnification
of the amount paid in settlement of a claim, but the costs incurred in reaching the
settlement arc indemniflable.' 46 In a third-party action, a director may be indemnified not
only for his litigation expenses but also for judgments, fines and amounts paid in
settlement.'" Furthermore, the third party provisions do not require the director to he
successful on the merits. 148 Rather, the director is only required to have acted in good
' 41
 N.V. Bus. Colo, . 1.Aw §§ 721-727 (McKinney 1980). For a general discussion of the many
variations among the state statutes see MODEL. BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED § 5 (1977
Supplement).
' 4 ' DEL. Cons ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983).
The Delaware statute does not exclude any other rights which a director might be entitled to
"under any' bylaws, agreement, vote of stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise ..." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f). A director, therefore, might be given broader indemnification protection
than that afforded by the Delaware statute, although it is likely that public policy places some
limitations on the extent to which a director can be indemnified. A number of' court s have indicated
that indemnification of conduct which violates traditional notions of' fiduciary responsibility and
good faith will not be permitted despite statutes or bylaws authorizing such indemnification„tiee
Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1963); People v. Drag Mining Corp., 13 A.D.2d
419, 424, 216 N.Y.S.2d 985, 990 (1961); Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819, 820
(1954).
Additionally, the "business judgment rule" would operate as a limit on the extent to which
disinterested directors would authorize indemnification of a recalcitrant director. Too broad an
indemnification principle is probably not prudent, and might subject the directors voting for such a .
bylaw to personal liability.
'" DEL. Cons ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983).
' 43 Johmton, supra note 139, at 1997.
'9'
	 CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983).
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(h) (1983).
Delaware allows the court finding misconduct to award indemnification for expenses notwith-
standing an adjudication of liability, but research to date has not discovered any instance in which a
court has done ibis.
146 Id.
'" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983).
"" PEI.. Cons ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983).
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faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be "in or not opposed to" the best
interests of the corporation.'" With respect to criminal actions, the director must not
have had reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful,'"
Before indemnification is granted in either a derivative or third party action it roust
first be determined that the director has met the applicable slat utory standard of conduct.
This determination may be made by the majority vote of a quorum of disinterested
directors, by independent legal counsel, or by the stockholders."'
While sections 145(a) and (b) specify circumstances in which a corporation may
indemnify a director, section I45(e) provides that a defendant director must be indem-
nified "to the extent that" he has been successful on the merits.'" In addition, the
statute permits a corporation to pay expenses incurred by the director in defending a civil
or criminal action in advance of the final disposition of the action.'" The advancement
must he authorized by the board of directors, and the director receiving the advance must
undertake to repay the advance unless it is ultimately determined that he is entitled to
indemnification.'• The statute does not require the undertaking to he secured, and the
common practice of corporations is to accept an unsecured promise to repay." 5
The Delaware statut e pro ,,ides additional protection to directors by allowing corpora-
tions to purchase insurance on their behalf "whether or not the corporation would have
the power to indemnify [the directors] against such liability. . . ."'" Literally read, this
section authorizes insurance against every type of fiduciary misconduct, no matter how
grievous. As a practical matter, however, insurance policies generally contain exclusions
for acts of self dealing or dishonesty, thereby bringing them within any limitations
imposed by public policy.
In summary, there are essentially four rules of indemnification applicable to legal
expenses incurred by a director in the performance of his duties under Delaware corpo-
ration law. First, in a shareholder derivative action, a director may he indemnified fOr
expenses, including attorney's fees, provided the director acted in good faith and in a
manlier reasonably believed to be "in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation, except where the director is adjudged guilty of misconduct or negligence."'
149
 Id. The New York statute is stricter in that it omits the words "or not opposed to" in the
provision dealing with third party claims, thereby granting indemnification only if the director was
acting in the interests of the corporation. NEW YORK Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 722-723 (McKinney 1977).
1 " DEL. CODE ANN, lit, 8, § 145 (1983).
151
 DEL. Con: ANN. tn. 8, § 145(d) (1983). As noted by one commentator, since most actions
against directors involve a majority of the directors it is often difficult to obtain a quorum of
disinterested directors. Further, when dealing with a public corporation it is very difficult, as a
practical matter, to hold a meeting to obtain shareholder approval every time indemnification is
sought. See jahri.sran _supra note 139, at 1998. Therefore, the best alternative is often to seek the advice
of "independent legal counsel.- The Delaware statute, however, does not offer a definition of that
term. See generally Onto REV. Cone ANN. HI. XVII, § 1701.13(E)(4) (Page 1976) (counsel not
"independent" if' he or his firm has been retained or performed services for the corporation or
person to be indemnified within the past five years).
152 DEL. CODE ANN. (it. 8, § 145(c) (1983). The sect ion authorizes, therefore, partial indemnifica-
tion of it director who is partially successful in a lawsuit. The relevant New York statute requires the
director to be "wholly successful" before he is cult itled to indemnification. See NEW YORK Bus. CORI'.
LAW § 724(g) (McKinney 1963).
" 3
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § l45(e) (1983).
154
1 " See JohnsIon, supra note 139, at 1999.
1"s
	 Coot• ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983).
1 " See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
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Because this right applies only to "expenses - it does not permit indemnification of an
amount paid in judgment or an amount paid in settlement. Second, in a third-party
action, a director ma he indemnified not only for litigation expenses but also for judg-
ments, fines and amounts paid in settletnent.' 56 The director need not he successful on
the merits, but only need to have acted in good fait h and not opposed to t he best interests
of the corporation. Third, a director must be indemnified in any suit Or proceeding to the
extent he has been successful on t he merits.'" Fourth, a director may be granted broader
indemnification rights by the bylaws, stockholders or other disinterested directors, to the
extent permitted by public policy.'"
E. Indemnification of. 	Officers Under the Labor-Managernent Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA•"' rep-
resents a significant attempt by Congress to regulate the administration and operation of
labor organizations. The 1,M RDA provides a statutory framework designed to ensure
financial responsibility of the unions.'" Section 501 of the LMRDA subjects union
directors, officers and agents to broad federal fiduciary standards.'"
This provision is similar in a number of respects to the fiduciary responsibility
provisions of ERISA.'" Both the LM RDA and ERISA establish a federal standard of
fiduciary responsibility.'" Both implement certain principles governing common law
fiduciaries, in light of the special problems and functions of unions and employee benefit
' 6 See supra notes 147 -48 and accompanying text.
'" See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
16 ' 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 - 531 (1976).
52 The impetus for the enactment of the LMRDA came from the investigations, reports and
recommendations of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management
Field, popularly known as the McClellan Committee, which exposed a significant number of union-
management abuses. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN LABOR OR MANAGEMENT
FIELD, INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1958) (hereinafter cited as
Committee Report).
'" 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1976). Section 501 provides:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization
occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group. It
is, therefore, the duty oleach such person, taking into account the special problems and
functions of a labor organization, to hold its money and property solely for the benefit
of the organization and its niembers atul to manage, invest, and expend the same in
accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies
adopted thereunder, to refrain front dealing with such organization as an adverse party
or in behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and front
holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the inter-
ests of such organization, and to account to the organization for any profit received by
him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his
direction on behalf of the organization. A general exculpatory provision in the constitu-
tion and bylaws of such a labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution of a
governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of duties
declared by this section shall be void as against public policy.
29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976).
04 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
"5 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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plans, to develop these federal fiduciary standards. 166
 Finally, both require fiduciaries to
act "solely for the benefit" of their organizations,'" and render void, as against public
policy, any exculpatory agreements which relieve fiduciaries of the liabilities imposed
upon them by the respective statutory frameworks.'" Because of these similarities, an
analysis of the cases decided under section 501 of the LMRDA concerning indenmilica-
don rights, of union fiduciaries is particularly relevant. to any discussion of ER1SA
fiduciary indemnification principles.
The indemnification issue can arise under LM RDA section 501 in a variety of
contexts. For instance a union may expend funds to pay for the legal representation of its
officers, either by an advancement of .
 current litigation costs, reimbursement of expenses
already paid, or the use of union counsel to defend union officials. 10 " In assessing the
validity of any advancement or reimbursement expenditure, courts traditionally consider
a number of factors such as the policies underlying the LMRDA,"° the express or implied
authorization of relevant internal union law, 171 general public policy relating to indem-
nification of fiduciaries, 172 t he nature of t he underlying action,'" the reasonableness of
the expenditure,'" and t he stage of t he proceedings at which the funds are expended. 175
The advancement and reimbursement issues will he discussed separately in analyzing how
these various factors come into play.
I. Advancement of Legal Expenses
The right of union officials to advance union funds to pay litigation costs incurred by
the officials in stale civil and criminal suits was addressed by the United States Dist rict
'" Compare H.R. Rio'. No. 93 -533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 323,reprinted in 1974 U.S. Com:
An. NEWS 4639, 4649 with 29 U.S.C. 501(a) (1976).
1" Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976).
1 " Compare 29 U.S.C.	 1110(a) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976).
1 " Section 501(b) of the LMRDA empowers union members to bring suit to enjoin the use or
expenditure of union counsel or union funds to defend union officials or to recover funds already
spent. 29 U.S.C. 501(b) (1976).
171) See Bartosic & Minda, Union Fiduciaries, Attorney's, and Conflicts of Interest, 15 U.C.D. L. REV.
227, 242 •(1981) (hereinafter cited as Union Fiduciaries); Comment, Counsel Fees for Union (Wirers
Under the Fiduciary Provision of Landrum-Griffin, 73 VALE L.J . 443, 449 (1964) (hereinafter cited as
Counsel Fees). See also Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1979) (public policy
favoring financial stability of unions sufficient basis for denying punitive damage award).
17 ) See, e.g., Kerr v. Shanks, 466 12 .2d 1271, 1277 -78 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Screen
Extras Guild v. Kerr, 412 U.S. 918 (1973); Local 92, Intl Ass)] of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers v. Norris, 383 F.2c1 735, 739 (5th Cir. 1967). See also, Union Fiduciaries, supra note 170,
at 244.
172  Morrissey v. Curran, 482 F. Stipp. 31, 52 (S.D.N X. 1979), aff 'd part, read in part, vacated in
part, 650 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1981); Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107 v. Cohen, 215 F.
Supp. 938, 940-41 (E.D. Pa. 1963), affil, 334 F.2d 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 921 (1964)
(hereinafter cited as Cohen II); Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp.
608, 617 (E.D. Pa.), alTd per curio's, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961)
(hereinafter cited as Cohen 1).
173 See Union Fiduciaries, supra note 170, at 283-93 (compares and contrasts the policies favoring
and opposing union payment of counsel fees in shareholder derivative actions, third party Stilts and
vendetta or strike suits); Counsel Fees, supra note 170, at 462-68.
See Morrissey v. Curran, 650 E.2d 1267, 1273 -74 (2d Cir. 1981) (where union officer benefits
from expenditure of union funds the court may determine whether the expenditure, notwithstand-
ing its authorization, is so manifestly unreasonable as to evidence a breach of the fiduciary obligation
imposed by Section 501(a)). See also Union Fiduciaries, supra note 170, at 293.
17 ' See Union Fiduciaries, supra note 170, at 299-307; Counsel Fees, supra note 170, at 462-68.-
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Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers Local
107 v. Cohen ("Cohen I"). '" The issue presented in Cohen I was whether such an advance-
ment constituted a violation of section 501, notwithstanding a resolution by union mem-
bership authorizing the expenditures."' The court held that because the authorizing
resolution exceeded the powers of the union membership as set. forth in the union's
constitution, the payments were impermissible under section 50 1. 178 Further, the court
held that the payments contravened the policies underlying LMRDA," 9 noting that "No
allow a union officer to use the power and wealth of the very union which he is accused of
pilfering, to defend himself against such charges, is totally inconsistent with Congress'
effort to eliminate the undesirable element which has been uncovered in the labor-
management field."'"
After the union amended its constitution to authorize the payment of union officials'
legal expenses, the issue of the right of unions to advance litigation expenses was again
before the court.'" Recognizing that the ultra vires rationale expressed in Cohen 1 no
longer applied, the court in Cohen II relied exclusively on the second basis of its earlier
decision to invalidate the advancement. The court, quoting the language of Cohen 1,
emphasized that such an advancement by the union would clearly be in contravention of
section 501.'"'
LM RDA cases following the Cohen I and Cohen II courts have generally rejected the
validity of advancing union funds to pay the legal expenses of union officials
example, in Milone v. English, 1 d 3 union members brought an action to compel officials to
restore to the union all counsel fees advanced to such officials during prior litigation.'"
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that the funds of
t Ile union were not available to defend officers who were charged with wrongdoing. ) " 5
The court stated in a footnote, however, that "[w]here there is no substance to a charge of
wrongdoing it may be that the union is not barred from standing the cost of the defense.
. . """ While the general rule rejects the concept of union funds being used to pay
litigation expenses, the Milone court recognized that an advancement of legal expenses in
a IN RDA suit may be justified if the suit is first determined to be without merit.
2. Reimbursement of Legal Expenses
Although advancement may violate section 501, the reimbursement of legal expenses
is not similarly prohibited. LM RDA cases follow other areas of the law which allow
1 " Cohen 1, supra note 172, 182 F. Stipp. it 608.
' 77 Id, an 616.
Id. at 620.
i79
 Id. at 620-21.
' 8" Id. See also Morrissey v. Curran, 482 F. Stipp. 31, 38-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
The common law origin of this general prohibition upon advances stemmed, in part. from the
courts' desire to prevent the financial power of an institution from overwhelming the plaintiff. See
generally Union Fiduciaries, supra note 170, at 272 - 73; Counsel Feet,supra note 170, at 458-459. Given
the number of lawsuits a union or ERISA fiduciary may he subject to, it is arguable Mar advance-
ments are necessary to prevent. the financial power of I he multitude of plaintiffs from overwhelming
the defendant fiduciary.
" 1 Cohen II, supra note 172, 215 F. Supp. at 939.
1 " hi. at 941.
' 8 ' 306 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"4 Id. at 816.
"5 Id. at 817. Accord, Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61, 154 (N.D. Ala.
1968).
I" 306 F.2d at 817 n.2.
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reimbursement when the fiduciary successfully defends charges against him and, corre-
spondingly, deny reimbursement when the fiduciary is unsuccessful."' An example of
the LM RDA's approach to this issue is Morrissey a. Segal.'" Segal arose after union
members had instituted a successful suit against union officials for paying ow union
funds in violation of the union's constitution.'" Segal posed the question whether a
negligent union trustee, who had not acted willluliy or in bad faith, could properly be
reimbursed with union funds for legal expenses which were incurred in his unsuccessful
defense.'" The Second Circuit held that the payment of attorney fees under such
circumstances violated section 501,'" noting that although prior LM R D A case law
indicated that the trustees could seek reimbursement if' they were exonerated, there was
no precedential support for extending indemnification if the trustees were found to have
breached their duties to the union. 192
A similar result was reached in Haldeman a. SheIdon. 193 Holdeman involved an action
brought by union members against union officers who allegedly expended union funds
without proper authority."' The union sought to intervene on behalf of the defendant
officers.' 95 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York began
by noting that the rule in Cohen 1, which prohibited the union from paying the legal lees
of a union defendant prior to a merits determination in the action, also prevented the
union front intervening and representing the union defendant.' 9" According to the court,
if intervention were allowed the rule prohibiting the advancement of legal fees could
always be avoided by simply allowing the union to represent. the defendants, as an
alternative to the payment of counsel fees.•' The court suggested, however, that if a
preliminary inquiry of the merits by the court revealed plaintiff did not have a good claim
and the interests of the union and defendants did not conflict, intervention might be
proper. r9 "
1 " See supra notes 38-40, 98-99 and 152.
'"" 326 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1975).
" 9 Id. at 124-26. See also Morrissey v. Curran, 351 F. Stipp. 775, 784-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Id. at
784. One defendant was found to have acted "recklessly' .
 and two were found negligent.
' 9 '1 526 F.2d at 126.
"" The court stated that none of the trustees could be reimbursed, deeming the distinction
between "negligent -
 and "reckless" behavior to be irrelevant to the question of attorneys' fees.
Morrissey v. Segal, 526 F.2d at 126.
1 " 526 1.2d at 127.
1 " 204 F. Stipp. 890 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 311 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1962).
'" 204 F. Supp. at 891-92.
"5 Id. at 892.
117 Id,
/r/. at 892-893. The court suggested in cases involving intervention that a procedure be
adopted whereby the court determines preliminarily whether the plaintiff has made a showing that
he has a claim and is likely to succeed. Id. Additionally, there should be an inquiry whether the
interests of the union conflict with those of the individual defendants. Id. The court rioted that the
degree of preliminary inquiry should be similar to that performed by a court on any notice for
injunctive relief. M. Arguably, if a court makes a preliminary determination that plaintiff s claim is
merit less and, therefore, has very little chance of success, and further determines that there is no
potential conflict between the union and the individual defendants, then Holdentan is authority not
only for allowing the union to intervene, but also authority for allowing the union to advance union
funds to the individual defendants for the payment of defense costs.
A case where intervention or advancement would be proper could arise where a union member
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After reviewing the claim in the matter before it, the Holderoalt court concluded that
the plaintiff had set forth a good cause of action, and that the interests of he defendants
and the union conflicted. The court observed, however, that "Nil the event that defen-
dants are successful in proving the contentions which they have urged herein, there is no
reason why the union may not reimburse them for legal expenses incurred in the defense
of this suit.' 99
While union law is relatively clear as to when reimbursement is proper in a trial on
the merits, it is relatively unclear regarding whet her a union can properly reimburse it
union defendant for legal services incurred, or amounts paid, in the settlement of an
action against the defendants. ln Morrissey a. Curran, 2 " the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, although it did not squarely address the issue,
suggested that a union's payment of legal services incurred in settlement of an action
against a union official would violate section 501. 2 "' Although commentators are divided
on this issue, 202 the better view favors such payment, provided there is an opinion by
independent legal counsel that the defendant had a meritorious defense with a high
probability of success. hithe absence of a policy allowing the union to pay settlement costs
of frivolous litigation, union officials would have an incentive to pursue meritless
to a successful termination on the merits in order to entitle themselves to reimburse-
ment. As a practical matter, this type of incentive would cause the union to incur the often
higher costs of litigation rather than settlement costs.
hi summary, there are three rules of indemnification applicable to legal expenses
incurred by a union officer in the performance of his duties. First, a union may generally
not advance funds to pay the legal expenses of union officials incurred in suits charging
them with a violation of their duties unless such charges are determined to be wholly
without merit,' Second, a union may reimburse a union official for legal expenses
incurred in successfully defending against charges of wrongdoing, but it may not reim-
burse hint if he is unsuccessful in his defense:4 " Third, the law is not settled as to whether
the union may pay for legal services incurred by a union official in settling an action
brings an action to construe the terms of internal union law. to such an instance, t here is no charge of
wrongdoing on the part of the union officials, and there is no conflict of interests between the union
and the officials. Intervention or advancement would clearly be proper since the action is in reality an
action against the union.
" 0
 Id. at 895.
26" 482 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 650 F.2c1 1267 (2d Cir. 1981).
2 "' Id. at 52. The district court held that the use of union funds, for the payment of legal services
rendered to union officials itt a settlement action would violate section 501. Id. The court intimated,
himever, that its holding was predicated to some extent upon the officials' probable culpability. Id.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed on the grounds that there was not sufficient evidence that the
suit had in fact been settled as opposed to being involuntarily dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Morrissey v. Curran, 650 F.2c1 1267, 1280-81 (2d Cir. 1981). The court. held, therefore, as far as the
officials were concerned that the suit was successfully defended and a payment of legal fees was
proper. Id. It is not clear from these cases whether a payment of legal fees incurred in settlement of
an action where the defendant had a high probability of success would be violative of Section 501.
112 Compare Union. Fiduciaries „supra note 170, at 315 (unions should have discretion to reimburse
officers for the legal expenses of settlement) with Counsel Fees, supra note 170, at 467 (union should
not have discretion to indemnify officer for settlement costs); cf. Rev. Rul. 82-223, 1982-2 C.B. 30!
(indemnification payments by private foundation fci• legal fees and costs incurred in settling suit
against manager are permitted).
202
	 supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
1"4 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
24	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol, 25:1
against him, hut the better view would permit such payment where the defense has a high
probability of success. 20'
F. Trust Law Principles as a Basis for Guidelines Governing the
Indemnification of ERISA Fiduciaries
As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, indemnification principles in the law of
trusts, private foundations, corporations and unions are in many instances similar. These
different areas of the law, however, are not in agreement. with respect to the more
difficult indemnification issues such as settlements and advances of litigation costs. Con-
squent ly, it is necessary to determine which area of law provides the best guidance for
developing ER1SA indemnification principles. 206
The application of corporate indemnification standards to ER1SA fiduciaries is
appealing for a number of reasons. Both the ease of having a ready-made standard
complete with interpretational case law and the self-evident shared rationale of encourag-
ing the best qualified persons to fill the positions support the adoption of the statutory
corporate indemnification rules. A closer examination of the analogy to corporate direc-
tors, however, suggests that corporate indemnification standards are not appropriate
guidelines for ERISA fiduciaries.'"
The roles of a corporate director and an ERISA fiduciary are distinguishable in a
number of respects. A director's main objective is to invest the shareholder's money in the
hope of a profit ; an ERISA fiduciary's main goal is to ensure the safety of t he fund's assets
in order to secure the financial well-being of the fund's participants. Arguably, more
liberal indemnity policies are appropriate for corporate directors to the extent they
encourage directors to engage in sometimes risky, but potentially lucrative, conduct by
minimizing personal liability in the event of failure. ER1SA, however, encourages pru-
dence and the maintenance of assets, and stricier indemnity standards are therefore
202 See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
2 " Given that most indemnification principles in the law of private trusts, charitable trusts,
private inundations and unions are essentially identical, these areas of law will not be separately
discussed, but will be collectively referred to as "the law of trusts- or "trust law" unless indicated
otherwise. It should he recognized, however, that the areas are distinct in many other respects and
should he treated accordingly.
207 One should note, when discussing whether corporate law indemnification standards are
appropriate for ERISA fiduciaries, that both Delaware, DEt„ Cone ANN. tit. 8. * 145(i) (Stipp. 1982),
and New York, N.Y. Bus. Gnu ,. Lnw § 723(c) (McKinney' Supp. 1982), provide t hat a corporation
may indemnify an officer serving, at its request, as fiduciary of an employee benefit plan to the same
extent that it may otherwise indemnify an officer who acts in good faith and in a manner reasonably
believed to be in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan. See also ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch . 32. 157.92-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (set ring "another corporation. partnership, joint
venture, trust or other enterprise"). Similarly, in collectively bargained Tali-F1anley plans, in the
absence of fraud or duress, neither the employers nor unions are prohibited from indemnifying
employer or employee trustees selected by them. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1959). These provisions are
of interest because they tend to undercut the argument that an ER1SA plait needs to offer generous
indemnification provisions in order to attract the ablest managers. in most instances the corporation
or other entity sponsoring an employee benefit plan, rather than the beneficiaries. selects the
managers. This suggests that the policy of obtaining able fiduciaries may be best served by limiting
the indemnification powers of ERISA plans. This will shift the risk of having to indemnify well-
meaning but legally derelict managers to the corporation or other entity which selected them, and
will encourage the corporation or other entity to supply its most qualified people as managers.
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appropriate.'" Significantly, trust and union law both subject t heir respective fiduciaries
to the highest standards of care in order to encourage financial responsibility with respect
to asset management.
A second distinction suggesting a more stringent indemnity policy for ERISA
fiduciaries concerns the difference between the relationships of fiduciary-beneficiary and
director-shareholder. An objectionable indemnity agreement is, to a certain extent, self-
correcting with regard to a shareholder-director relationship. Shareholders can vote for
new directors or sell their shares to one willing to accept the indemnity situation. A
beneficiary of an employee benefit plan, however, like a beneficiary of a private trust or a
union member, has far less opportunity to remedy what he perceives to be a dangerously
lenient indemnity arrangement.'" Specifically, the beneficiary neither chooses the ERISA
fiduciary, nor has the opportunity of changing to a different ER1SA plan if he is unhappy
with the indemnity situation.
These two factors — the trustee's goal of fiscal conservation and the beneficiary's lack
of choice — liken the ERISA fiduciary to the union and trust fiduciary, and distinguish
the ERISA fiduciary from the corporate director. These two reasons, therefore, provide
support for t he conclusion that reference to the law of unions and t rusts is more helpful
than reference to the law of corporations in formulating indemnification guidelines for
ERISA funds."'"
Finally, the public policy behind corporate indemnification provisions is different
from the public policy underlying ERISA indemnification provisions. When enacting
corporation indemnification laws, state legislatures are frequently motivated by the desire
to encourage corporations to incorporate in t heir respective states in order to obtain more
franchise tax •evenues.'" Consequently, legislatures often adopt liberal indemnification
standards to provide a favorable incorporation atmosphere. In contrast, the fiduciary
responsibility provisions of ERISA were enacted in part to protect the security of employ-
ees benefits from t he widespread fiduciary abuse and misuse of employee benefit plan
assets which had historically permeated such programs. 2 " Given these different policies
2" There is a historical distinction between the role of an industrial or mercantile corporate
director and the role of a trust - like fiduciary. For example, officers of money-holding institutions
were often denied the protection traditionally afforded corporate directors by t he business judgment
rule-on the basis That the public did not assume the same degree of risk with a financial institution as
it did with a corporation. See e.g., Williams v. Fidelity Loan & Sav, Co., 142 Va. 93, 69 - 70, 128 S.E.
615, 623 (1925); New Haven Trust Co. v. Doherty, 75 Cont. 555, 562, 54 A. 209, 212 (1903). See
generally Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liability iMitrance, 67 CoLum. L.REV. 716, 726 -27 (1967). But
see, e.g., 11.1.. ANN. STA•. ch. 1 7. § 3405(15) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (banks may indemnify directors
to the same extent as may other corporations) (the modern rule).
2""
	 generally, Morrissey v. Curran, 650 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1981). The Morrissey court noted
that "unlike shareholders, who can sell their ownership interest if dissatisfied with management's
conduct, union members dissatisfied with an unresponsively - managed union cannot sell their mem-
bership rights nor, in most cases, is it realistic to expect them to resign from membership or to change
to another union." Id. at 1273,
' 1 " Arguably, reference to trust law in debiting the scope of ERISA indemnification principles is
congressionally mandated insofar as Congress expressly stated that the ERISA fiduciary responsibil-
ity provisions codify principles of trust law. See mpra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the relevant legislative history of ERISA.
n ' See, e.g.., Car y, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 88 YALE L.J. 663, 668
(1974).
2" See H.R. Rio'. No. 93-533. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 323, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 4639, 4649. See also Committee Report, supra note 162 at 5, which points to the similar abuses
L.N1 RDA was enacted to prevent.
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behind corporate indemnification laws and ER1SA fiduciary principles, corporate indem-
nification policies should not serve as a model for ERISA indemnification standards.
Application of liberal corporate indemnification principles to ERISA fiduciaries would
have the effect of lessening the threat of personal liability, thereby encouraging the very
abuses ERISA was designed to prevent. 2 '
0. The Express Provisions of ERISA Limit Application of Trust Law
Indemnification Principles
While union and trust law precedents provide a helpful background for developing
indentnification guidelines for ER ISA fiduciaries, any adopted standards must com port
with the fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA. The legislative history of ERISA
indicates clearly that the fiduciary duties of ER1SA trustees are to be interpreted in light
of the special nature, purpose and importance of employee benefit plans. 2 " Section 404
of ER1SA requires a fiduciary to discharge his duties for the exclusive purposes of
providing benefits to the plan participants and defraying the reasonable expenses of
administering the rust. 215
 Additionally, section 404 dictates that f he fiduciary act with the
care, skill, and diligence of a prudent man in the same or similar circumstances. 2 " If a
fiduciary breaches any of these fiduciary duties, section 409 subjects him to personal
liability for all losses sustained by the plan as a result of his breach. 217 Any agreement
which attempts to relieve or exculpate a fiduciary from such personal liability is void
under section 410. 2 " In light of these provisions, it is clear that any trust or union law
indemnification principle purporting to relieve an ERISA fiduciary from personal liability
arising from a breach of his fiduciary duties would be void as well. Trust or union law
indemnification principles, therefore, can he applied to ERISA fiduciaries only to the
extent that such principles are consistent with the terms of sections 409 and 410. 2 "
1. An ER1SA Fiduciary's Right of Indemnification and Exoneration
As a general rule, an ERISA fiduciary is entitled to indemnification for any expenses
"properly and actually" incurred in the administration of the plan. 220 As is the case with
212 Accord N. J. STAT. ANN'. § 14A. at x-xi (West 1969) ("It is clear that the major protections to
investors, creditors, employees, customers, and the general public have come, and must continue to
come, from Federal legislation and not from state corporation acts'').
2 ' 1 See H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 323, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE Cow:. & An.
NEWS 4639, 4651. See also, N.L.R.B. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1981); Marshall v. Glass
& Glassworker's Pension Plan, 507 F. Stipp, 378, 383 (1). Hawaii 1980).
215 For the full text of Section 404, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
216 Id.
2" For the full text of Section 409, see ,rnpra note 13 and accompanying text.
2 " For the hill text of Section 410, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
219 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), which provides that the provisions of ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. . .
This language supports the conclusion that Irma law indemnification principles are not applicable to
ERISA fiduciaries to the extent such principles are inconsistent with ERISA. See also Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522-23 (1981) (state law governing pension funds which is
inconsistent with the provisions of ERISA is preempted). In addition, since ER1SA fiduciary duties
are to be interpreted "in light of t he special problems" of employee benefit plans, LMRDA principles
are applicable only to the extent that they are also consistent with ERISA.
220
	 supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Section 408, which permits an
ER1SA fiduciary to receive "reimbursement of expenses properly and actually incurred."
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private trusts, this indemnification right should encompass not only a right of reim-
bursement where the fiduciary has made payment out of his own funds, but also a right of
exoneration which allows the fiduciary to use the plan assets in the first instance to
discharge an obligation. 221 The right of exoneration exists, however, only if the liability in
question is properly incurred. If, for example, the fiduciary exercised his right of exoner-
ation and it was later determined that the expense was not justified, section 409 of ERISA
would require the expense to he a personal liability of the fiduciary. Furthermore, section
406 of ERLS/1 222 deems the fiduciary's exoneration of a personal expense to constitute an
act of self-dealing insofar as he uses plan assets Foi - his own benefit.' Section 406
expressly prohibits self-dealing and, therefore, exoneration of an expense improperly
incurred is outlawed as well. In light of these general principles, an ERISA fiduciary's
right to reimbursement and exoneration will he discussed separately.
An ERISA fiduciary's right to reimbursement for legal expenses is very similar to
reimbursement• rights granted under the law of unions and trusts. In a suit which benefits
the plan,' the fiduciary is entitled to reimbursement, pursuant to section 408 of ERISA,
for all proper legal expenses. 225 In a suit charging the fiduciary with breach of his
fiduciary duties, a successful defense of such charges would entitle the fiduciary to
reimbursement for legal expenses, while an unsuccessful defense would not. 226 As previ-
221 See supra note 25 and accompanying text for a discussion of a trustee's right of exoneration.
222 See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a full discussion of Section 406.
243 It should he noted that potential co-fiduciary liability exists pursuant to Section 405, where a
fiduciary improperly exercises his right of' exoneration and a co - fiduciary permits the exoneration io
occur without making a prior determination that the expense exonerated is proper. Section 405
states in relevant part:
(a) i n addition to any liability winch he may have under ;my other provision of this part,
a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable for a breach 6f fiduciary responsibility of
another fiduciary with respect to the same plan in the following circumstances:
(1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or
omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 1104(a)( I) of this title in the administra-
tion of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a fiduciary, he has
enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes
reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach.
29 U.S.C. § 1105 (1976).
224 An example of a suit which benefits the plan would be one where the Mist instrument is
interpreted or where there is an action and the interests of the trust and fiduciary are identical.
22"
 Legal expenses incurred in litigation which benefit the fund are "proper," according to trust
law principles. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Therefore, Section 408 of ERISA should
operate to permit reimbursement of such expenses. The principles of reimbursement and exonera-
tion discussed with respect to benefit litigation are equally applicable to third party actions which
involve activities or transactions entered into by the fiduciary in his representative capacity on behalf
of the plan. As used, herein, third party claims do not involve ERISA liabilities as far as the claimant
is concerned. -
228 Accord. Department of Labor, Op. 77 -66/67A, ERISA Update (Washington Service Bureau)
(1977). See also Department of Labor, Op. 77-64/65A, ERISA Update (Washington Service Bureau)
(1977).
Significantly, while traditional private and charitable trust law permits indemnification of a
trustee who, although guilty of a breach of trust., has taken action in good Nth which benefits the
estate, such a principle is not applicable to an ERISA fiduciary. Section 409 of ERISA renders the
fiduciary personally liable for all expenses incurred as a result of a breach of trust, and Section 410
operates as a prohibition of any indemnification principle which would relieve [he fiduciary of that
personal liability regardless of the fiduciary's good faith. Accord, Department of Labor, Interpretive
Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 at 476-77.
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ously noted, legal expenses incurred in successfully defending breach of trust charges are
"proper: . according to trust and union law principles. 227 Therefore, section 408 of
ERISA should operate to permit reimbursement of such expenses. Legal expenses in-
cu rred in unsuccessfully defending breach of trust charges are not, according to trust law
and union principles, " proper"22S and, therefore, use of plan funds to pay for such
expenses would constitute an act ()I' sell-dealing in violation of section 406 of ERISA.
The extent to which an ERISA fiduciary's right of exoneration entitles him to
advance payments from the fund to satisfy legal expenses incurred in defending trust
related litigation depends upon the context in which the litigation arises. In an action
seeking a construction of the terms of an employee benefit plan, the fiduciary's legal fees
are "proper" under trust law because the litigation involves rights and therefore benefits,
under the plan it self." 9 Furthermore, such an action involves the fiduciary only in his
representative capacity. Thus, the fiduciary's right of exoneration would clearly entitle
hint to use the plan's assets in the first instance to satisfy any reasonable legal fees incurred
in his own defense. Moreover, any legal fees incurred by the plan's own counsel in
furthering the plan's interests are incontestably a "proper - expense of the plan and, as
such, could be satisfied with plait assets.
The fiduciary's right to exoneration of legal expenses, however, is not as evident in an
action alleging breach of trust. II' t lie fiduciary is successful in defending the litigation,
then the legal expenses incurred are "proper" and subject to exoneration. If', however,
the fiduciary does not successfully defend the breach of trust charges, then the legal
expenses' incurred are not "proper .
 and therefore are not subject to exoneration. The
obvious analytical problem presented by this exoneration concept is that the fiduciary is
seeking to exonerate the expense before there has been a determination on the merits.
This concept is inherently flawed because it requires the fund to determine whether such
expense is "proper" prior to trial. Whether plan assets can be advanced to it fiduciary for
payment of legal expenses in a breach of• trust action cannot, therefore, depend upon
whether such expenses are "proper, -
 but must instead depend upon whether an advance
would be consistent with t he fiduciary's duty to manage litigation prudently. 2"
Trust and union law precedents do not squarely embrace a fiduciary's right to receive
advances lOr legal fees incurred in defending breach of fiduciary duty charges. There are,
however, suggestions in trust and union law that such advancements may be proper
under certain circumstances. For example, in Ball v, Mills," the Florida District Court of
Appeals for the First District denied the trustee's request for an interim inward of
"' See supra notes 40 and 187.
' 2 " See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
729 id.
'2"
 The District' Court for the Northern District of Illinois has expressly recognized that an
advancement is not per se violative of ERISA Section 410, 29 § 1110 (1976). This provision
prohibits the fiduciary from being relieved of a personal liability. See Central Slates, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., No. 77 C 4335, slip op. at 6
(N.D. III. Oct. 26, 1979) (available on 1.F.X1S, Genfed library, Dist. file). This conclusion is undoubt-
edly correct insofar as it recognizes that prior to a determination on the merits of breach of fiduciary
duty litigation, nn advance cannot, by definition, relieve the fiduciary of a responsibility or liability.
The fact t hat an advancement does not per se violate ER IS A Sect ion 410 does not, however, relieve the
fiduciary of his duty under ERISA Section 404 to determine whether such an ielvancemem is
prudent.
=a' 376 So. 2d 1179 (Ha. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Mills v. Ball, 388 So. 2d 1116 {Fla. 1980).
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attorneys' fees, but noted that "an award of interim attorney's fees [may] be made prior to
conclusion of the litigation" under circumstances where the trustee could demonstrate
that he would eventually be entitled to reimbursement.. 232 Similarly, in Milone v. En-
eish,233 the court, while rejecting the general concept of union advancement, noted that
"[w]here there is no substance to a charge of wrongdoing it may be that the union is not
barred from standing the cost of the defense. . . ."234 In both these cases, the courts
indicated that an advancement might be proper given a prior determination that the
fiduciary would eventually be entitled to reimbursement from the trust or union assets. 2"
This reasoning is applicable to the case of ER1SA fiduciaries. An advancement to an
ERISA fiduciary for legal expenses incurred in defending breach of trust charges might
well be consistent with the provisions of ERISA and, therefore, prudent, if there exists a
prior determination that the fiduciary would eventually become entitled to reimburse-
ment.
2, The Duty of an ERISA Fiduciary to Manage Litigation Expenses Prudently
Section 404 of ERISA charges fiduciaries with t he duty of defraying the "reasonable"
expenses of administering the plan with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" of a
prudent man "under the circumstances then prevailing." 236 This duty necessarily encom-
passes an obligation to manage all litigation affecting the plan in a prudent manner, arid
to keep all legal expenses relating to such litigation reasonable in amount. A fiduciary
would appear authorized, therefore, to advance legal fees incurred in litigation relating to
the plan, pursuant to his duty to manage such litigation, if the advancement is both
prudent under the circumstances and reasonable in amount.
The issue of whether the advancement is prudent. under the circumstances depends
upon a reasonable determination by the fiduciary authorizing the advance that. the
fiduciary receiving the advance will eventually become entitled to reimbursement from
the fund. Although it may often be difficult fOr a fiduciary to assess accurately the
probable outcome of litigation, the problem becomes especially acute where the fiduciary
is also the defendant, In such a circumstance, the fiduciary must determine the merits of
his own case, and, on t his basis, decide whether it would be prudent to advance funds to
himself. Quite obviously, the fiduciary's role as a defendant conflicts with his role as a
fiduciary. The extent of this conflict is especially apparent when some, but not all, of the
fiduciaries are defendants. A nondefenclant fiduciary may have conflicting loyalties in
making a determination whether to advance. 237 The nondefendant fiduciary not only has
a loyalty to t he plan but also most certainly will feel a loyalty to the defendant fiduciary
with whom he works.
An example of the conflicting roles of a trust fiduciary is presented in Donovan v.
232 376 So. 2d at 1181.
233 306 F.2d 814 (1).C. Cir. 1962).
234 Id. at 817 n.2.
235 See also Department of Labor, Op. 77-66167A, ERISA Update (Washington Service Bureau)
(1977) (payment by ERISA fund of legal expenses incurred in settlement of litigation, i.e. in advance
of merits determination, proper if independent legal counsel opines that fiduciary did not breach his
fiduciary obligations).
236 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
237 See generally NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322,333-34 (1981) (The legislative history of
ERISA confirms that Congress intended in particular to prevent trustees 'from engaging in actions
where there would be a conflict of interest with the fund. . . ").
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Bierwirth,"" where directors of Grumman Corporation, who were also officers of Grum-
man and the trustees of the Grumman pension plan, voted, along with other directors, to
have the corporation oppose a tender offer of 1:1 - v Corporation."" These officers and
directors thereafter met as trustees, and caused the pension plan not to tender its shares
of Grumman, and to purchase additional shares so as to make it more difficult for LTV to
gain control of Grurnman.'w The Secretary of Labor brought aft action against the
trustees alleging that.t hey had breached their fiduciary duties. 1 ' The Secretary charged
that the trustees' decision to purchase additional Grumman stock was not for the exclusive
benefit of the plan, but rather for the benefit of Grumman Corporation." 2 In addition,
he alleged that the trustees breached their fiduciary duty to act prudently when they
failed to resign as trustees once it was apparent that their roles as director-officers and
trustees conflicted.""
In finding that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duty, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals criticized the trustees' failure to explore where their primary duty
lay."' According to the court, the trustees had Iwo permissible alternatives when faced
with conflicting loyalties. First, the court suggested that the trustees' duty to act prudently
in administering the plan might have required them to resign their posts as trustees for
the duration of the tender offer."5 Alternatively, the court noted, it would have been
prudent for the trustees to solicit the advice of independent counsel to determine what
course of action the plan should have taken."" Having failed to exercise either of these
options, the court found that the trustees breached their fiduciary responsibility to act
prudently."' The court noted:
We do not mean by this either that trustees confronted with a difficult
decision need always engage independent counsel or that engaging such
counsel and following their advice will operate as a complete whitewash
which, without more, satisfies ERISA's prudence requirement. Rut this was,
and should have been perceived to be, art unusual sit muion peculiarly requir-
ing legal advice from someone above the battle. 2 t 8
Applying the logic of Bierwith to the advancement issue, it appears that the
defendant-fiduciary should either allow the remaining neutral fiduciaries to make the
determination, or resign for the duration of the litigation and allow a newly appointed
temporary fiduciary to act. Alternatively, the fiduciary should solicit the advice of inde-
pendent. legal counsel249 to determine whether an advance under such circumstances
"" 680 F.2d 2133 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Bierwith v. Donovan, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982),
complaint dismissed, Donovan v. Bierwith, 5 E.B.C. 1065 (Feb. 21, 1984) (fiduciary violations caused no
loss to the plan).
32" 6811 F.2d at 266-67.
24 " Id. at 267-68.
241 Id. at 270.
242 hi.
243
294 Id. at 271.
243 Id. at 271-72.
245
	 at 272.
247 Id. at 276.
2 " Id, at 272-73. See also N,1...R.B. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. '322, 329 (1981), where the
Supreme Court stated that a Tall-Hartley ERISA trustee has "an unwavering duty of complete
loyalty to the beneficial-[ies] 
249 It is imperative that the independent legal counsel be truly independent and have no
loyalties to either the fiduciary, the beneficiaries or the plan itself. The Department of Labor appears
to share this view by requiring counsel which determines the merits of a settlement to be independent
December 1983]	 INDEMNIFICATION UNDER ERISA	 31
would be consistent with the fiduciary's duty to manage all litigation prudently. 25° In
giving such advice, independent legal counsel should focus on three factors: the likeli-
hood that the fiduciary will successfully defend the suit, the fiduciary's ability to repay the
advances if he loses the action, and whether a failure to advance legal fees would expose
the fund to losses in excess of t he probable cost of such fees."'
The importance of focusing on these three factors can best be illustrated by looking
at a specific example. Assume, for instance, that a fiduciary is sued for breach of his
duties, and independent legal counsel determines that there is a great probability the
fiduciary will successfully defend the action. In light of such a favorable opinion, assum-
ing there is no reason for the fiduciary to believe independent legal counsel's opinion is
erroneous, it might be prudent for the fund to advance legal fees to the fiduciary. If, in
addition to the favorable opinion of independent legal counsel, the fiduciary demon-
strates an ability to repay all amounts advanced, then an advance under such circum-
stances would undoubtedly be prudent. 252 Under these circumstances, eventually the
fiduciary is likely to be entitled to reimbursement from the fund, and the fund is in little
danger of not being able to recoup its advancement.
A more difficult question is presented when the fiduciary does not demonstrate an
ability to repay t he advanced litigation expenses. Under these circumstances, the issue of
whether an advance would be prudent depends to a much greater extent upon the
strength of independent counsel's opinion, and also upon a consideration of whether the
trust's failure to advance expenses exposes the plan to losses in excess of the probable cost
of such fees. For example, if independent legal counsel determines that a breach of trust
suit is frivolous and there is a strong probability the fiduciary will prevail on the merits,
then an advancement might be prudent even in the absence of an ability to repay. 253
Similarly, if independent legal counsel opines that the fiduciary has only a reasonable
chance of succeeding on the merits and an unsuccessful defense would potentially expose
the plan to substantial losses,'" then it might be prudent for the plan to advance defense
costs to the fiduciary or have its counsel undertake the defense directly notwithstanding a
fiduciary's inability to repay. Although the fiduciary's chance of success may not be high,
of the plan and its fiduciaries. See Department of Labor, Op. 77-66/67A, ERISA Update (Washington
Service Bureau) (1977),
250 The "prudence" of an advancement turns, to a great extent, upon the fiduciary's chances of
successfully defending the charges. Even if the fiduciary defendant resigned for the duration of the
litigation, prudence would dictate that the remaining neutral fiduciaries or a temporary fiduciary,
given the potential for conflicting loyalties, obtain the advice of independent legal counsel prior to
making an advance. Once having obtained independent legal counsel, the neutral fiduciaries'
objectivity or ability to assess the merits of legal issues would not be as open to question.
2 ." Significantly, the following discussion of whether to advance legal fees to a fiduciary relates
only to civil litigation. In criminal litigation arising out of a fiduciary's relationship to the plan, given
the serious nature of criminal charges, an advancement would probably never be prudent and,
therefore, would violate ERISA Section 404. For a discussion of this issue in the union situation, see
Union Fiduciaries supra note 170 at 268-320.
222 See Department of Labor, Op. 77-66167A, ERISA Update (Washington Service Bureau)
(1977) where the DOL supports the idea of advancing legal fees to a fiduciary if the fiduciary
demonstrates an ability to repay such advances if his defense of breach of trust charges is ultimately
unsuccessful.
253 See Milone v. English, 306 F.2(1 814, 817 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Ball v. Mills, 376 So. 2d 1174,
1181 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied sub /WM. Mills v. Ball, 388 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1980).
L 5' For example, in a breach of contract suit where the fund is vicariously liable for the trustee's
wrongdoing.
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the duty to manage litigation prudently, given the potential of significant losses to the
plan, might reqUire that advancements be made to enable the fiduciary to put forth the
best possible defense in an effort to avoid such losses. In instances where the plan is not
exposed to significant losses, an advancement would not be prudent in the absence of an
ability to repay.
The next situation to be considered is where independent legal counsel opines that.
the fiduciary has breached his fiduciary duties. In such instances, it is never prudent to
advance funds, even if the fiduciary has the ability to repay and a failure to advance such
expenses might expose the fund to potential losses. Its fact, when presented with an
adverse opinion from independent counsel, prudent litigation management may require
that the plan retain legal counsel to institute suit against the breaching fiduciary. 255
A related question is whether a fiduciary may prudently authorize the fund to pay
amounts in settlement of pending or threatened litigation involving breach of trust
allegations. The problem presented by settlement is similar to the problem presented by
fee advancement, because in both situations it is impossible to determine whether an
expense is "proper" before a determination on the merits is mad e. 256 Given the fact. that.
the payment of settlement costs is also a question of prudent litigation management, the
use of independent legal counsel to opine on the merits of the fiduciary's defense is
suggested here as well. In this regard, it is significant to not.e that the Department of
Labor has expressly permitted a fund to make payments in settlement of pending or
threatened litigation if the fund obtains a written opinion of independent legal counsel
that the fiduciary has not breached his fiduciary responsibilities. 257 Although the Depart,
meat of Labor did not specify its reasoning, this "settlement. principle" is undoubtedly
based upon the conclusion that the fiduciary would he entitled to reimbursement if the
case went to trial and he was found not to have breached his duties.
A fiduciary's duty to manage prudently all litigation affecting the plan necessarily
imposes upon hint a duty to insure that all fees expended in litigation are reasonable. 2J8
Slated another way, a fiduciary is only entitled to advancement of', or reimbursement for,
reasonable attorneys' fees. 259 If he allows the plan to incur unreasonable attorneys' fees,
he would he breaching his fiduciary duties and would he personally liable, pursuant to
ERISA section 409, for all fees in excess of those which are reasonable."' The'question of
whether litigation expenses are "reasonable" depends to a great. extent upon the context
of the litigation. In an action brought solely to determine the proper construction of the
plan agreement, I he fiduciary is only a nominal party to the action because he is exposed
to no potential personal liability. The plan is the real party in interest, because an
unfavorable construction of its terms might require it to pay out additional funds. For
example, in an action brought by a group of persons who claim that the terms of the plan
If there are other fiduciaries not charged with breaching their duties, prudent litigation
management would dictate that they institute a suit against the wrongdoing trustee in order to avoid
the potential co-fiduciary liability of ERISA Section 405. For the full text of ERISA Section 405 see
supra note 223.
256 Research to date has found no trust law dealing with the settlement issue and, as noted
before, union law has given the settlement issue uncertain treatment. See supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
25v Depa rtment of Labor, Op. 77-66/67A, ERISA Update (Washington Service Bureau) (1977).
25" See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
255 Id.
260 See supra note 13 and accompanying text,
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entitle them to plan benefits, a construction of the plan terms which adopts their claimed
interpretation would require the fund to pay out additional monies. In such a circum-
stance, the fiduciary requires only nominal representation, and legal expenses incurred
by him ought to be considered reasonable only to the extent that they cover such nominal
representation. The plan, however, does need separate counsel to defend the litigation
actively. Consequently, the plan's legal expenses are reasonable to the extent such ex-
penses are necessary to such active representation.'"
In contrast to actions brought to determine proper plan construction, in a breach of
fiduciary duty action, the plan is only a nominal party if it has suffered no.loss. In such an
instance, the plan requires only nominal representation, and its legal expenses are
reasonable only to the extent they cover such nominal representation. The fiduciary is the
active party in such litigation because he is exposed to potential personal liability. Accord-
ingly', the fiduciary needs separate counsel to play an active role in his defense, and his
legal expenses are reasonable to the extent they cover such representation.
Finally, in a breach of fiduciary duty suit. where there is potential harm to the plan,
both the plan and the fiduciary are real parties in interest because both are exposed to
loss. Under such circumstances, both the fiduciary and the plan need separate counsel
and the legal fees incurred by them are reasonable to the extent they are necessary to
assert their respective positions.
11. EMPLOYEE INDEMNIFICATION PRINCIPLES
A. The Provisions of ERISA Relevant to Employee Indemnification
An employee of an ERISA benefit plan is a "party in interest" in all related litiga-
non.252 A n ERISA fiduciary is literally prohibited from authorizing employee indem-
nification payments because section 406 prohibits the transfer of plan assets or an
extension of credit to a party in interest.'" Section 408 of ERISA, however, provides a
statutory exemption from section 406 which validates employee indemnification ar-
rangements in certain circumstances. 20" In pertinent part, section 408(h) provides t hat the
prohibitions contained in section 406 do not apply to contracting with a party in interest
for his services if no more than reasonable compensation is paid for the services. 2" The
Labor Department's regulations provide that "reasonable compensation" includes ad-
vances of expenses "properly and actually" incurred by an employee in the performance
of his duties.'" A problem similar to that encountered in fixing the scope of an ERISA
fiduciary's right to indemnification arises with respect to ERISA employee indemnifica-
tion, however, because neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of ERISA
defines the term "proper." Given this absence of congressional guidance, an examination
" 1 The term "active representation" contemplates representation by an attorney who takes the
lead role in prosecuting or defending the Litigation as the interests of his clients are the most directly
affected. The term "nominal representation - contemplates representation by an attorney who takes a
passive role in defending or prosecuting the litigation as the interests of his client are only second-
arily affected by those of the real party in interest.
2 " 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(A) (1976).
2 " 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1976). For the full text of Section 406 see suprn note 6 and accompanying
text.
254 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2) (1976).
265 Id .
2"6 29	 § 2550.408C-2(b)(4) (1982).
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of the analogous employee indemnification principles in t he law of agency is helpful its
formulating a workable standard for when, and under what circumstances, indemnifica-
tion of an ERISA employee is warranted.
The relationship of a principal and agent is essentially contractual.'" An agent's
right to indemnification for expenses incurred in performing his chilies is, therefore,
primarily dependent upon the contractual agreement reached between the parties.'"
Subject to the terms of the agreement, an agent is entitled to indemnification for all
expenses incurred in performing acts authorized by the principal.'" Conversely, an agent
is generally not entitled to indemnification for expenses resulting Irons unauthorized acts,
unless the acts benefit the principal. 27" Indemnification is also unavailable to an agent
where losses result solely from the agent's negligence or personal fault,' or for losses or
expenses incurred following an illegal transaction if' the agent knew of the illegalit y,272
In applying these general rules, courts have uniformly' authorized reimbursement of
an agent's attorneys' fees and other costs of litigation incurred in defending an action
brought against him by third persons, where the action arises out of authorized acts clone
in furtherance of his agency. 2 " Significantly, an agent against whom an action has been
2" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGF,NCY § 438 (1958) (hereinafter cited as AGENCY) ("A principal
is under a duty to indemnify the agent in accordance with the ternis of the agreement with hint,").
See Shell Oil Co. v. Hunt, 124 F.2d 482, 483 (10th Cir. 1941); Schmitt v. Continental-
Diamond Fibre Co., l 16 F.2d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 1940). See also AGENCY, supra note 267, at § 438.
2 " See Minnesota Farm Bureau Mktg. Corp. v. North Dakota Agricultural Mktg. Ass'n, 563
F.2d 906, 913 (8th Cir. 1977); McKinnon and Mooney v. Fireman's Fund indemnity Co., 288 F.2d
189, 190 (6th Cir. 1961); Toombs v. Lewis, 362 Ill. 181, 189, 199 N.E. 127, 130 (1935); Blank v.
Rodgers, 82 Ca], App. 35, 45, 255 P. 235, 239 (1927). See also AGENCY, MI,Pra note 267, at § 438(2)(a).
An agent is entitled to indemnification for expenses incurred in an authorized transaction even
if he committed a breach of duty in carrying out the transaction. The principal would, of course, be
entitled to set off against any indemnification payments all losses arising from the agent's breach of
duty. See Ande v. Haas, 251 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Ky. 1952); Schwarting v. Arid, 40 Cal. App. 2c1 433,
441 -42, 105 P.2d 380, 384 (1940). But see Feiger v. Iral Jewelry, Ltd., 41 N.Y.2d 928, 928-29, 363
N.E.2d 350, 351, 394 N.Y.S.2d 626, 626 (1977).
270 Craven v. Craven, 407 ill. 252, 263, 95 N.E.2d 489, 495-96 (1950); Ross v. Clark, 18 Colo. 90,
92-93, 31 P. 497, 498 (1892). See also AGENCY, supra note 267, at § 440 (comment b).
2 T1 See Hopkins v. Hacker, 105 N,H. 150, 151, 195 A.2d 587, 588 (1963); Blair v, United
Finance Co., 235 Or. 89, 92, 383 P.2d 72, 74 (1963); Hagen v. Koerner, 64 N.J. Sup. 580, 585, 166
A.2d 784, 786 (1960).
272 See Bibb v. Allen, ;49 U.S. 481, 490 (1893); Mills Novelty Co, v. Dupouy, 203 F. 254, 259 (7th
Cir. 1913); Hagen v. Koerner, 64 N.J. Sup. 580, 586-87, 166 A.2d 784, 787 (1960); Samuels v.
Oliver, 130 111. 73, 84-5, 22 N.E. 499, 503 (1889). See also Ac,ENev,supra note 267, 21 § 467; 3 Am. JuR.
2d AGENCY § 245 (1962).
Significantly, an agent's right to indemnification can include both a right to reimbursement and
a right to exoneration depending upon the terms of the agency agreement. See Hornstein v. Kramer
Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1943); Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal, 2d 808, 816, 141
P.2d 732, 737 (1943); Evans, Coleman & Evans v. Pistorino, 245 Mass. 94, 99, 139 N.E. 848, 851,
(1923); see also AGENCY, supra note 267, at § 438 (comment b). In the absence of an agreement to
exonerate, the law of agency appears to limit an agent to a right of reimbursement
2 " Johnston v. Suckow, 55 111. App. 3d 277, 281, 370 N.E.2d 650, 653 (1977); Virginia Corp. v.
Russ, 27 Ill. App. 3d 608, 611, 327 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1975); Dailey Bros. v. W. A. Clements Co., 120
Misc. 310, 311, 198 N.Y.S. 387, 389 (1923); First Nat'l Bank v. Tenny, 43 111. App. 544, 554 (1892).
See also AGENCY, ,supra note 267, at § 439(d).
The Restatement (Second) of Agency limits an agent's indemnification right for third party
litigation expenses to suits brought in good faith. AGENCY, supra. note 267, at § 439(d). The treatise
points out that it is not clear whether an agent would he entitled to indemnification for expenses
incurred in defending third party actions brought in had faith, Id. at § 439 (comment a). As a
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brought for conducting an authorized activity is entitled to indemnification for reasonable
expenses incurred in defending the action regardless of his success or failure. 274 In order
to entitle himself to indemnity, the agent need only demonstrate that he acted in good
faith and that the expenses incurred were reasonable and necessary. 275
 This right to
indemnification also extends to litigation expenses incurred in reasonably settling such an
action in good faith."
The principal's duty to indemnify the agent for expenses incurred in defending a
third party action does not arise until the principal is given notice of the third party claims
and declines to assume their defense.'" If the agent fails to notify the principal and
thereby denies the principal an opportunity to defend, the agent is entitled to indemnity
for expenses incurred in defending the action only if t he agent establishes he made a
reasonable defense. If the principal has been prejudiced by the agent's failure to notify
him of the suit, however, the agent loses his right to indemnification to the extent of the
prejudice."
There are two further qualifications on an agent's right to indemnification. First, an
agent may not recover expenses incurred in an action brought by the principal if the
practical matter, however, it is not logical to condition the agent's indemnification right on the good
or bad faith of the third party bringing the suit, and a stronger argument for allowing indemnifica-
tion exists when the action is grounded in bad faith.
274 See McKinnon and Mooney v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 288 F.2d 189, 190 (6th Cir.
1961); Admiral Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201, 202 (2d Cir. 1936); Western Smelting &
Refining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 150 Neb. 477, 482-83, 35 N.W.2d 116, 121 (1948); Abrams v. Harry
A. Roth & Co„ 310 ill. App. 490, 494-95, 34 N.E.2d 725, 726.28 (1941); Sanitary Dist. v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 392 111. 602, 612, 65 N.E.2d 364, 368-69 (1946). See also AGENCY,
supra note 267, at § 438 (comment e) (Appendix).
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Long v. Vlasic Food Products Co.. 439 F.2d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 1971); McKinnon and
Mooney v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 288 F.2d 189, 190 (6th Cir. 1961); Western Smelting &
Relining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 150 Neb. 477, 487, 35 N.W.2d 116, 121 (1948). Whether
the agent has made a good faith defense and whether the expenses of such defense are reasonable
are questions of fact. AGENCY, supra note 267, at § 438 (comment e).
2 " Long v. Vlasic Food Products Co., 439 F.2d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1971); Western Smelting &
Refining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 150 Neb. 477, 487, 35 N.W.2d 116, 121 (1948). See also 3
C.J.S. Agency § 322 (1973). As stated in AGENCY:
[i]f an agent reasonably believes that he is, or may be, subject to liability because of an
authorized transaction, he does not have to wait until an action is brought against him.
After notifying the principal, he is entitled to indemnity for payments in a settlement
made in good faith and reasonably if: (a) he is in justifiable ignorance of a defense, or
(b) the extent of liability is uncertain, or (c) liability is doubtful.
AGENCY, supra note 267, at § 438 (comment c) (Appendix).
277 Long v. Vlasic Food Products Co., 439 F.2d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 1971); Differential Steel Car
Co. v. MacDonald, 180 F.2(.1 260, 270 (6th Cir. 1950); Western Smelting & Refining Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 150 Neb. 477, 487, 35 N.IA'.2c1 116, 121 (1948). The Restatement (Second) of Agency points
out that:
Mf the agent notifies the principal of action against him and asks him to defend it, the
judgment against the agent who defended or submitted in good faith is res judicata as
to the principal, with reference to the liability of the agent and the amount, and the
agent is entitled to be indemnified for his expenses . . , .
AGENCY, .supra note 267, at § 438 (comment e) (Appendix). See also 3 C.J.S. Agency § 322 (1973).
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Sunset-Sternatt Food Co. v. Boltz', 36 Cal. Rptr. 741, 748, 389 P.2d 133, 140 (1964). See
also AGENCY, supra note 267, at § 438 (comment d).
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agent is found guilty of nonperfOrmance or misperformance of his duties. 279 To hold
otherwise would, in effect, require the principal to pay for the right to sue an agent who
breached his duties. Second, in a suit by a third party against. both the principal and the
agent. where the principal provides competent attorneys to defend both himself and the
agent, the agent is not entitled to hire separate counsel and receive indemnity for his
attorneys' fees: 28 " To hold otherwise would require the principal to incur unnecessary
expense.
AgencY . indemnification principles, unlike trust law indemnification principles, do
not directly conflict with any express provisions of ERISA. Subject to the reasonableness
requirement of ERISA, therefore, whenever an indemnification payment is deemed
"proper" under traditional agency law, such a payment is also "proper' . under ER ISA. In
authorizing an employee indemnification payment, however, an ERISA fiduciary must
act in a manner that conforms with the prudent:). requirements of section 404. 2 " The
fiduciary can satisfy these requirements by first obtaining the advice of independent legal
counsel that traditional principles of agency law would sanction an indemnification
payment under the circumstances, and then by determining that the payment is reason-
able in aMount. 2 H 2
1 1. .SUCCESTED INDEMNIFICATION GUIDELINES FOR ERISA FIDUCIARIES
AND EMPLOYEES
In light of the variety and complexity of indemnification situations faced by ERISA
fiduciaries, it is impossible to develop a single standard that may be applied in all
situations. It is possible, however, to develop guidelines or factors which should be
considered in every indemnification situation. Each of these factors would, of course, take
on a varying degree of significance depending upon the circumstances facing the
fiduciary. The following guidelines are suggested as appropriate standards to be followed
by trustees of an employee benefit plan when determining whether an ERISA fiduciary or
employee is entitled to have the plan pay legal expenses incurred in litigation relating to
the plan.
A. Management of Litigation
The ERISA trustees' duty to manage all litigation affecting the plan requires the
trustees to keep the costs of such litigation "reasonable." 2 " There are a number of ways
that fiduciaries may insure reasonable litigation costs. The plan's regular or in-house
counsel should review all litigation matters at their outset. The purpose of this review is to
make a preliminary determination of the type of litigation, its projected scope, and the
nature and extent of legal services necessary for its prosecution, as well as an assessment
of the probable outcome.
The type of litigation facing a fiduciary defendant will essentially hill into one or
more of three categories. The first category is litigation which benefits the plan by
279 Cory Bros. & Co. v. United States, 51 F.2d 1010, 1013 (2d Cir. 1931); Wyoming Bank &
Trust Co. v. Waugh, 606 l'.2d 725, 731 (Wyo. 1980); See also AGENCY § 438 (comment k), supra note
267.
2" See Adams v. North Range Iron Co., 191 Minn. 55, 59, 253 N.W. 3, 5 (1934).
2"r See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
'2 " See generally supra notes 248 -50 and accompanying text.
2'O
	 supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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construing the terms of the plan. Such "benefit litigation," in its pure form, does not
involve the fiduciaries as individual defendants, although, as a practical matter, a breach
of fiduciary duty may be alleged. The second category is third party litigation, which
involv-es activities of the fiduciary undertaken in his representative capacity on behalf of
the plan. For example, a claim by a third party which alleges that the fiduciary wrongfully
breached a contract entered into for the benefit of the plan involves a third party action.
As a rule, third party claims do not involve ERISA liabilities insofar as the claimant is
concerned. The third category of litigation is that which involves an alleged breach of an
ERISA fiduciary duty.
In benefit litigation or third party litigation a fiduciary's counsel should have a
minimal or nominal role, because the fiduciary is not the real party in interest and is not
exposed to personal liability. Any counsel fees paid to a fiduciary's counsel should be
limited, therefore, to the amount of fees necessary to obtain nominal representation. Any
work of a fiduciary's counsel beyond nominal representation should he subject to the
approval of the other fiduciaries before the plan pays the fiduciary's counsel for such
extra work. The plan's counsel, on t he other hand, should take an active rote in benefit
litigation or third party litigation, as the plan is the real party in interest.
In breach of fiduciary duty litigation, the fiduciary defendant is the real party in
interest. Consequently, the fiduciary's counsel should actively defend the suit, 11' there is
no potential harm to the plan, the plan is only a nominal party and requires only nominal
representation. If harm has occured or may occur to the plan, the plan is also a real party
in interest and requires separate representation in order to attempt recovery from the
person or persons responsible for causing the loss.
The management of employee litigation also requires an initial review to determine
the type of litigation involved, but the standards to be applied vary slightly. Generally, the
type of litigation facing an employee will fall into one of two categories. The first category
involves authorized activities of the employee, including activity involving illegal conduct
provided the employee was unaware of the illegality. The second category involves the
employee's unauthorized activity.
In authorized activity litigation, the employee is not t he real party in interest because
he has acted solely on behalf of and at the direction of his principal, the plan. Therefore,
plan counsel may defend the employee in an authorized activity action. In contrast, in
unauthorized activity litigation, the employee is t he real party in interest because he is a
party to the action as a result of his own alleged frolic. In such circumstances, the
employee should retain his own counsel, and the plan should determine whether to bring
a separate action against t he employee if it has suffered any harm as a result of such frolic.
In both employee and fiduciary litigation, all litigation expenses payable by the plan
should be billed on a monthly basis and subject to a monthly review by the trustees. In
heir review, the trustees should determine not only whether the expenses are "reason-
able" but also whether all pre-approved expenses are within their established limits. In
addition, one fiduciary counsel or one employee counsel should ordinarily represent all
fiduciaries or employees who are similarly situated, so as to keep . costs reasonable, unless
there is a clear showing of conflict between the fiduciary or employee defendants."'
2 " The extent to which such dual representation would he proper would be subject to the
limitations imposed on multiple representation by Canon 5 of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. For example, in DR 5-105(c) a lawyer is permitted to represent multiple clients only if
it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interests of each and if each consents to such
multiple representation after full disclosure of' the possible effects such representation could have on
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An additional factor to be considered in managing employee or fiduciary litigation is
the existence of insurance. No fiduciary's or employee's legal expenses should be paid by
the plan where there is insurance, whether paid for by the plan or otherwise, covering
such expenses. Furthermore, when an insurance company is defending the action, the
fiduciary or employee should be required to accept representation by the insurance
company, and should not be allowed to have separate counsel paid for by the plan.
B. Advancement of Litigation Expenses Prior to a Determination on the Merits
I. Fiduciary Litigation
In deciding to advance litigation expenses in fiduciary litigation, the various types of
such litigation must be distinguished. For example, in benefit or third-party litigation,
where only nominal representation is involved, any litigation expenses may be immedi-
ately advanced becatise the fiduciary is really only a nominal party to the action and no
charges of wrongdoing are being leveled against him.
The decision whether to advance legal expenses for fiduciaries in civil act ions alleging
breach of Fiduciary duty, however, depends upon a balancing of several factors, The
non-defendant fiduciary must. consider the probable outcome of the suit, the ability of the
defendant fiduciary to repay and the potential harm to the plan. As a general matter, the
fiduciary defendant should never be advanced legal fees unless he undertakes to repay
such advances with interest if he is unsuccessful in his defense. in this manner, the plan
can minimize any losses it 'night otherwise suffer front an advancement that later turns
out to be improper because the fiduciary is found to have breached his duties. Further-
more, all breach of fiduciary duty cases should be reviewed by independent legal counsel
("Counsel - ) to determine the probable outcome of the litigation and the potential expo-
sure of the fund to liability if such expenses are not advanced. • hi this manner, the
fiduciary can assess the defendant's likelihood of eventual entitlement to reimbursement
and the overall harm that could result to the plan even if' reimbursement seems unlikely.
If Counsel opines that the fiduciary will defend the breach of trust charges successfully,
and the fiduciary demonstrates an ability to repay all advances, the plan may properly
advance reasonable litigation expenses. The risk to the plan is reduced as t he fiduciary
may likely he entitled to reimbursement and, if not, the fiduciary has the financial means
to repay the money given to him. If , however, Counsel determines that the fiduciary will
probably not successfully defend the breach of trust charges, the plan should not as a
general practice advance legal expenses. With a low probability of success on the merits,
the fiduciary's probability of being entitled to reimbursement is similarly low, so an
advancement would be imprudent.
Where the fiduciary is unable to demonstrate an ability to repay, an advancement
should generally not he authorized. Given the inherent difficulty of assessing the merits of
any action, there is a substantial risk of loss to the plan if an advancement is made and the
fiduciary is unsuccessful in his defense. Exposure to this risk might be prudent where
counsel opines that there is a very low probability of the fiduciary being found liable, or
where there would be substantial exposure of plan assets to liability by a decision not to
advance. Given such extraordinary circumstances, a decision to advance without a de ► -
onstrated ability to repay could be prudent.
the lawyer's independent professional judgment. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL. RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-105(c) (1979).
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In any case where the decision to advance is made, the neutral fiduciaries should
review the stains of 1 he litigation, as frequently as necessary, to ensure that the circum-
stances have not changed so as to render continued advancement imprudent.. A regular -
review will give 1 he fiduciaries an opportunity to terminate the advances belbre counsel's
expenses become unreasonable in amount or unreasonable given some change in circum-
sta nces.
In instances where Counsel determines that the conduct of the fiduciary involves a
clear violation of ERISA, there should never he an advancement of expenses. This .is so
regardless of the fiduciary's ability to repay or the potential for harm to the plan from a
failure to advance, In such cases, the plan is likely to have a claim against the fiduciary and
an advancement under such circumstances would clearly be imprudent and, conse-
quently, a violation of ERISA Section 404. 285
The plan should not advance the fiduciary legal tees in criminal cases involving
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties regardless of the fiduciary's ability to repay the fees or
the potential harm to the plan by a failure to advance. Given the serious nature of
criminal charges, any advancement cannot be justified as prudent under the circum-
stances and, therefore, would violate ERISA section 404. 2 "
2. Employee Litigation
In deciding whether to advance litigation expenses in employee litigation, the consid-
erations vary from those attendant upon the advancement decision in fiduciary litigation.
For example, in authorized activity litigation the employee defendant may he advanced all
reasonable litigation expenses incurred in defending the litigation. The employee is being
stied as a result of acts undertaken for the benefit of his employer, and the employer
should bear the expenses arising from the employee's activities regardless of the outcome
of the litigation.
In unauthorized activity litigation, however, the same rule does not apply. Where the
unauthorized activity has benefited the plan, the employee defendant. may be advanced
all reasonable litigation expenses incurred in defending the litigation, provided Counsel
opines that the employee acted in good faith and that the unauthorized activity did not.
violate the express provisions of ERISA. The employee was still acting in furtherance of
his employer's goals and the employer should bear the expenses arising from such
activities. Where the unauthorized activity does not benefit the plan, however, the em-
ployee defendant should not receive an advancement for any legal costs incurred in
defending the litigation. The employee has acted on his own behalf, and there is no
reason the employer should be required to bear the cost of defense,
C. Reimbursement of Legal Expenses After a Determination on the Merits
Reimbursement of legal expenses, like advancement, depends upon the type of
litigation involved. In fiduciary benefit and third party cases, the fiduciary defendant
should he reimbursed for all reasonable legal expenses incurred in nominally defending
2" See supra note 4 for the text of Section 404.
2 " Id. This rule assumes, of course, that the prosecuting governmental agency has satisfied the
requirements of obtaining an indictment in good faith so that a valid basis exists for the charges.
Further, if the fiduciary is ultimately successful in defending said criminal charges he will be able to
obtain reimbursement later.
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the litigation. In civil breach of fiduciary duty cases, however, charges of wrongdoing are
aimed at the fiduciary. if the fiduciary successfully defends the breach of trust charges,
the fiduciary is entitled to reimbursement. of reasonable legal expenses. The fiduciary's
expenses a rc an ordinary cost. of doing business which ought. to be absorbed by the fund.
In criminal breach of fiduciary cases, where the fiduciary successfully defends breach of
trust charges, the fiduciary is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable legal expenses only
if the fiduciary also successfully defends charges in any related civil litigation, or if none,
Counsel opines t hat there has been no civil breach of fiduciary duty. This rule insures
consistency in the reimbursement area, and takes into account t he fact that t he standard
of proof in a criminal case is higher than t hat required in a civil suit.
Reimbursement is never proper, however, where the fiduciary does not successfully
defend the breach of' trust charges. In such an instance the fiduciary has acted for his own
benefit, and his litigation expenses are not properly chargeable as expenses but rather are
personal liabilities.
In employee litigation, an employee's right to reimbursement is governed by the
same principles governing the propriety of an advancement, because employee indem-
nification does not depend upon the success or failure of the employee in defending the
D. Payment of Settlement Amounts
The law is not clear when amounts paid in settlement may be properly advanced or
reimbursed. Applying the same principles discussed above, however, a number of guide-
lines may he formulated. Assuming the decision to cont ribute to the settlement is oth-
erwise prudent, a fiduciary should be indemnified for contributions made to the settle-
mem of fiduciary litigation if' Counsel opines that the fiduciary has not. breached his
fiduciary duly. Similarly, an employee should be indemnified for contributions made to
the settlement of litigation, if Counsel opines that the employee has not. engaged in
unauthorized activity' not resulting in a benefit to the plan. Not to allow indemnification
under such circumstances would discourage settlements and would, in effect., force the
fiduciary or employee to proceed with a more costly trial even where he is certain to be
exonerated. Public  policy, therefore, should encourage settlement of employee and
fiduciary litigation, and indemnification of settlement amounts aids in achieving that
result.
CON'CLUSION
The extent. to which a fiduciary or employee of an ERISA plan is entitled to
indemnification for litigation costs incurred in his official capacity is subject to varied
interpretation. While the statutory language of ERISA provides for indemnification of
such costs when they are "proper,-
 the statute does not offer a definition of the term. The
legislative history of ERISA is similarly devoid of any explanation or discussion of this
term. Accordingly, indemnification requests are often subject to an ad hoc decision
making process, which not only produces inconsistent results but also subjects the persons
authorizing the payments to ERISA liability when the indemnification subsequently is
determined not to have been "proper."
Such confusion makes managing an ERISA plan a difficult task, and may discourage
qualified persons from becoming fiduciaries because they have a high likelihood of incur-
ring personal liability under ERISA by authorizing indemnification payments without
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standards as to what is proper or because they may he unable to obtain advancement or
indenmification when sued themselves. There is, therefore, .a need for a consistent,
systematic approach for determining the propriety of EIUSV-indemnification pay-
ments.
The guidelines suggested in this article are designed to fill that need by establishing
an analytical framework to determine when litigation expenses are "proper" and, there-
fore, indemnifiable. The guidelines do not provide an easy answer to that question, but do
set forth a number of factors which reflect on the propriety of an indemnification expense
and which ought to be considered each time an indemnification request is received. By
repeatedly and systematically considering these factors, fiduciaries will be equipped to
make prudent. and consistent indemnification decisions. In this manner, fiduciaries will
have a greater likelihood of accurately assessing when a given expense is "proper," and
therefore indernnifiahle, than would be the case if they simply continued an ad hoc
approach.
Each determination relating to indemnification is necessarily one of degree, but the
guidelines, by adding some amount of certainty to the decision making process, will
encourage qualified persons to serve as ERISA fiduciaries and may help reduce the
number of instances where fiduciaries are subject to subsequent ERISA liability for
having made an incorrect indemnification determination.
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